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Doctoring Discrimination
in the Same-Sex Marriage Debates
ELIZABETH SEPPER*
As the legalization of same-sex marriage spreads across the states, some
religious believers refuse to serve same-sex married couples. In the academy, a
group of law and religion scholars frames these refusals as “conscientious
objection” to the act of marriage. They propose “marriage conscience protection”
that would allow public employees and private individuals or businesses to refuse
to “facilitate” same-sex marriages. They rely on the theoretical premise that
commercial actors’ objections to marriage are equivalent to doctors’ objections to
controversial medical procedures. They model their proposal on medical
conscience legislation, which allows doctors to refuse to perform abortions. Such
legislation, they say, would dispel conflicts over same-sex marriage and lead to
acceptance of gay couples’ relationships.
This Article argues that same-sex marriage objections lack the distinct and
compelling features of conscientious objection recognized by law. It offers the first
systemic critique of medicine as a construct for the same-sex marriage debates. It
demonstrates that legislative protection of conscientious objection traditionally has
been limited to life-and-death acts for which the objector has direct responsibility
and further justified in medicine by ethical commitments particular to the
profession—bases that are absent from the marriage context. By identifying the
theoretical foundation of conscientious objection protections, this Article provides
the groundwork for distinguishing between conscience claims that can be justified
and those that cannot, in medicine and beyond.
This Article further contends that the experience of medical conscience
legislation represents a cautionary tale, rather than the success story that marriage
conscience proponents claim. Conscience protection in the medical model could
actually increase conflict and entrench opposition. Ultimately, these critiques
undermine the theoretical and practical foundations of “marriage conscience
protection.” They suggest that antidiscrimination law, where we have traditionally
balanced religion and equality, constitutes a more useful lens through which to
view religious accommodation.

† Copyright © 2014 Elizabeth Sepper.
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INTRODUCTION
“I will not injure or kill another human being,” Elliott Welsh told the draft
board.1 His objection to participating in war did not come from a “still, small voice
of conscience” but rather was “so loud and insistent” that he preferred
imprisonment to the Armed Forces.2
“I must be obedient to the word of God. From his own mouth he said ‘Thou
shalt not kill,’” labor and delivery nurse Yvonne Shelton stated.3 She could not
“participate in a procedure that would end a life” and thus refused to assist in
abortions.4
Photographing a lesbian couple’s commitment ceremony “would disobey God
and the teachings of the Bible,” the owners of Elane Photography contended.5 Their
religious beliefs meant they could not photograph the couple’s ceremony. As a
result of their refusal, they faced and lost an antidiscrimination suit.6
A group of law and religion scholars, including Douglas Laycock, Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Thomas Berg, Carl Esbeck, and Richard Garnett, frame each of
these cases as “conscientious objection.”7 As states enact marriage equality, these

1. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1970) (plurality opinion) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2. Id. at 337 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Shelton v. Univ. Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
4. Id. at 223 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 432 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d,
309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
6. See id. at 433.
7. See Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have
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scholars, occasionally joined by others, come together to advocate for their
proposed “marriage conscience protection” (MCP) statute that would allow
businesses and individuals engaged in commerce to refuse to facilitate same-sex
marriages.8 Under the proposal, religiously affiliated organizations—hospitals,
in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate?
Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 260 (2010);
Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns
Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 103 (Douglas Laycock,
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008); Douglas Laycock,
Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra, at 189, 194–95; Roger
Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939 (2007); Marc D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 NW.
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 307 (2010); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for
Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra, at 77; Fredric J. Bold, Jr., Comment, Vows to Collide: The Burgeoning
Conflict Between Religious Institutions and Same-Sex Marriage Antidiscrimination Laws,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (2009).
8. The only clear point of disagreement between these scholars is their support for,
opposition to, or agnosticism toward same-sex marriage. Letter from Thomas C. Berg, St.
Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law,
Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. & Richard
W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., to Christopher G. Donovan,
Conn. Speaker of the House (Apr. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Berg et al. Conn. Ltr.], available at
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/letter-to-rep.-donovan-re-bill-899-04-20-09.pdf; Letter
from Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Robin Fretwell
Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of
Law, Univ. of Mo. & Richard W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch.,
to John Baldacci, Governor of Me. (May 1, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice
.blogs.com/files/sp-384-me-letter-to-governor.pdf; Letter from Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives
Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law,
Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. & Richard
W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., to John Lynch, Governor of
N.H. (May 1, 2009) [hereinafter Berg et al. N.H. Ltr.], available at http://mirrorofjustice
.blogs.com/files/letter-to-gov1.-lynch-re-h.b.-436-1.pdf; Letter from Douglas Laycock, Yale
Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., to John Baldacci, Governor of Me.
(Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08
/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html; Letter from Douglas
Laycock, Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law & Professor of Religious Studies,
Univ. of V.A., Michael Perry, Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory Univ. & Marc
D. Stern to Lisa Brown, Senate Majority Leader, Wash. State Senate (Jan. 28, 2012),
available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/washington2012-me-too-brown.pdf; Letter
from Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., to
Christopher G. Donovan, Conn. Speaker of the House (Apr. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Laycock
Conn. Ltr.], available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/04/samesex
-marriage-and-religious-liberty-issues-in-connecticut.html; Letter from Douglas Laycock,
Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., Andrew Koppelman, John Paul
Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ., Michael Perry, Robert W. Woodruff
Professor of Law, Emory Univ. & Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec. Dir., Am. Jewish Cong.,
to Iowa lawmakers (July 15, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirror
ofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html;
Letter
Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., Andrew

706

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:703

insurance companies, social service providers, and the like—could exclude gay

Koppelman, John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ., Michael Perry,
Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory Univ. & Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec.
Dir., Am. Jewish Cong., to John Lynch, Governor of N.H. (May 22, 2009), available at
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/newhampshireexemptionslynch2.pdf; Letter from
Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., Andrew
Koppelman, John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern Univ., Michael Perry,
Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory Univ. & Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec.
Dir., Am. Jewish Cong., to David A. Paterson, Governor of N.Y. (May 8, 2009), available at
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty
-and-samesex-marriage.html; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash.
& Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, James Oberstar Professor of Law & Pub. Pol’y,
Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard
W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern & Edward
McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law to Brian E. Frosh,
Chairman, Md. State Sen. (Jan. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Wilson et al. Md. Ltr.], available at
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/maryland-letter-1.pdf; Letter from Robin Fretwell
Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives
Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of
Mo., Richard W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern,
Acting Co-Exec. Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish Cong. & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.,
Professor of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, to Iowa lawmakers (July 9, 2009),
available
at
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on
-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor
of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St.
Thomas Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard W. Garnett,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec.
Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish Cong., & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law,
Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, to Jamie Pedersen, Representative, Wash. State Legislature
(Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/washington-followup
-house-members-6239-es2.7.2012-1.pdf; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of
Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St.
Thomas Sch. of Law, Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard W. Garnett,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec.
Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish Cong. & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law,
Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law to Paul A. Sarlo, N.J. Senate Judiciary Comm. Chairman
(Dec. 4, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/12-4-2009-nj-sarlo-ssm
-letter-1.pdf; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch.
of Law, Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Carl H.
Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of
Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern, Acting Co-Exec. Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish
Cong. & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, to
Sheldon Silver, N.Y. Assemblyman (May 8, 2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice
.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/05/scholars-letter-re-ssm-and-religious-liberty.html; Letter
from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C.
Berg, James Oberstar Professor of Law & Pub. Policy, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law,
Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard W. Garnett, Professor of Law,
Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stern & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor
of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, to Dean G. Skelos, Senator of N.Y. (May 17, 2011)
[hereinafter Wilson et al. N.Y. Ltr.], available at http://www.nysun.com/files
/lawprofessorsletter.pdf.
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couples from employee spousal benefits, deny them visitation privileges, and refuse
to treat their marriages as valid throughout their married lives.9 Small retailers,
rental agencies, and professionals could assert religious objections to selling goods
or services to same-sex married (or marrying) couples.10 A dress shop could
prevent a lesbian from saying yes to her wedding dress. A landlord could deny a
same-sex married couple a home. Lawyers could refuse to prepare prenuptial

9. The proposed statutory text reads:
(a) Religious organizations protected.
. . . [N]o religious or denominational organization, no organization operated for
charitable or educational purposes which is supervised or controlled by or in
connection with a religious organization, and no individual employed by any of
the foregoing organizations, while acting in the scope of that employment, shall
be required to
(1) provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or
privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of any
marriage; or
(2) solemnize any marriage; or
(3) treat as valid any marriage
if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such
organizations or individuals to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3.
10. The proposed text reads:
(b) Individuals and small businesses protected.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole proprietor, or
small business shall be required to
(A) provide goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization or
celebration of any marriage, or provide counseling or other services that
directly facilitate the perpetuation of any marriage; or
(B) provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or
(C) provide housing to any married couple
if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing would cause such
individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such small businesses, to violate
their sincerely held religious beliefs.
(2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if
(A) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar good or
services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere without substantial
hardship; or
(B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or
official, if another government employee or official is not promptly
available and willing to provide the requested government service
without inconvenience or delay; provided that no judicial officer
authorized to solemnize marriages shall be required to solemnize any
marriage if to do so would violate the judicial officer’s sincerely held
religious beliefs.
(3) A “small business” within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) is a legal
entity other than a natural person
(A) that provides services which are primarily performed by an owner of
the business; or
(B) that has five or fewer employees; or (C) in the case of a legal entity
that offers housing for rent, that owns five or fewer units of housing.
Id. at 3–4 (emphasis omitted).
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agreements. With MCP, gay couples could face discrimination from “I do” until
death do them part.
These scholars claim “marriage conscience protection” does not break new
ground, but rather is part of a long tradition of legal recognition of conscientious
objection to military service, execution, and abortion.11 In particular, they rely on
the premise that commercial actors’ objections to same-sex marriage are equivalent
to doctors’ refusals to perform controversial procedures—abortion in particular.12
By linking abortion and same-sex marriage, MCP proponents seek to include
same-sex marriage legislation within the traditional (and circumscribed) areas
where law explicitly protects conscientious objection (such as serving as a soldier,
participating in the death penalty, and providing controversial medical
interventions).
This Article argues that same-sex marriage objections lack the distinct and
compelling features of conscientious objection recognized by law. It offers the first
systemic critique of the theoretical premise for extending the conscientious objector
model to the same-sex marriage debates. It demonstrates that legislative protection
of conscientious objection traditionally has been limited to life-and-death acts over
which the objector has direct responsibility and further justified in medicine by
ethical commitments particular to the profession—bases that are absent from the
marriage context. The Article further contends that, even if marriage and medical
conscientious objections shared a theoretical foundation, medical conscience
legislation proves a poor model for protecting conscience. Legislation in its image
would be unlikely to create an enduring solution to the conflict between religious
objection and gay rights.
Part I describes religious objections to same-sex marriage and the scholarly
debate over legislative accommodation of these objections. It shows that our legal
system traditionally balances religion and equality within the antidiscrimination
framework.13 MCP would instead treat refusal as “conscientious objection” to the
act of marriage that lies beyond the scope of antidiscrimination law. Part II

11. Id. at 6 (citing as precedent federal laws permitting conscientious objectors to
military service and “accommodating health care professionals who conscientiously object to
participating in medical procedures such as abortion or sterilization”).
12. Id. (linking proposal to “other laws protecting the right of conscientious objection,
especially in the health care context”).
13. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption from
Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those
Who Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
173 (2012); Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 123; Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or
False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions to Equal Marriage Statutes Return Us to a
Religious Understanding of the Public Marketplace, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 236 (2010);
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom,
5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274 (2010); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex
Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation
Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2012); Mark Strasser, On Same-Sex Marriage and
Matters of Conscience, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2010); Shannon Gilreath, Not a
Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 205 (reviewing
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 7).
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establishes the MCP proposal is explicitly modeled on legislative protection of
physicians’ refusals to perform abortions.
Part III argues that same-sex marriage objections, as well as some recent claims
in medicine, lack the distinct and compelling features of conscientious objection
recognized by law. Drawing on legal and bioethical discussions, it identifies five
principles justifying legal recognition of conscientious objection. The first three—
involvement in the taking of life and the objector’s necessity and proximity to the
alleged bad act—support conscientious objection across the contexts of war,
execution, and abortion. The second two—the centrality of moral reasoning to
medicine and the grounding of objections in professional ethics—bolster physicians’
specific claim to act on conscience. The identification of these principles constitutes a
significant contribution to discussions of conscientious objection in marriage,
medicine, and beyond, allowing us to distinguish those protections that are justified
from those that are not. It becomes clear that objections to providing goods and
services to same-sex couples do not reflect these settled bases.
Part IV contends that even if there were significant similarities between abortion
and same-sex marriage objection, medical conscience legislation is a poor model,
failing to safeguard conscience consistently and effectively.14 Protecting corporate
“conscience” inevitably undermines individual conscience. When a business forbids
serving same-sex couples, individual employees who believe all should be treated
equally will be forced to violate their consciences or lose their employment.
Part V argues that the experience of medical conscience clauses nonetheless offers
lessons for legislatures considering religious exemptions. Instead of providing a “liveand-let-live solution” as its advocates predict,15 the medical model seems likely to
entrench opposition to gay equality and impose heavy burdens on same-sex couples.
16
As an increasing number of states move to legalize same-sex marriage, we can
expect more claims of religious objection and calls for legislatures to enact marriage
conscience protection. Engaging with MCP is particularly pressing because its
proponents have been at the vanguard of public discourse and scholarly debate. While
no state legislature has enacted their proposal in full, several have adopted narrower
17
18
versions. Others have debated adopting MCP. With new challenges to state
19
marriage bans based on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor,
20
the question of religious objections will only become more salient. Ultimately, the

14. See generally Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA L. REV. 1501
(2012).
15. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Life After
Prop 8, 14 NEXUS 101, 109 (2009).
16. Adam Wollner, The Map of Gay Marriage: Hawaii Becomes Latest to Legalize,
NPR.ORG (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/11/13
/245001905/the-map-of-gay-marriage-hawaii-becomes-latest-to-legalize (reporting that 2013
was “a landmark year for the gay-rights movement” with same-sex marriage legalized in
Illinois, Hawaii, Delaware, Minnesota, Rhode Island, California, and New Jersey).
17. See infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
19. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
20. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Jernigan v. Crane,
No.4:13-cv-00410-JLH (E.D. Ark. July 15, 2013) (challenging “the constitutionality of
Arkansas’s laws excluding same-gender couples from marriage and forbidding recognition
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theoretical and practical critiques advanced here lend support to the argument that
antidiscrimination, not conscientious objection, is the appropriate lens through which
to consider any religious accommodation.
I. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE TURN TOWARD CONSCIENCE
Throughout its history, the gay rights movement has faced claims that recognizing
LGBT equality would impose burdens on the religious liberty of those who object to
21
gay sex or coupling. As today’s most prominent gay rights issue, same-sex marriage
has been no different.
This Part sets forth the debates over religious objection and same-sex marriage.
Section A describes the expansion of marriage equality and the attendant objections
from religious believers. Section B identifies a split over the appropriate legal
framework for any potential accommodation of religious objectors.
A. Religious Objection to Marriage Equality
States are increasingly expanding—rather than limiting—marriage equality. Thus
far, lawmakers have enacted same-sex marriage in Illinois, Hawaii, Minnesota,
Delaware, Rhode Island, Maryland, Washington, New York, New Hampshire,
22
Vermont, and the District of Columbia. New Jersey and California legislators also
23
passed marriage equality acts, which were then vetoed. Maine voters recently
approved same-sex marriage, after initially rejecting legalization efforts by the
24
legislature. That is not to suggest that state engagement has been uniformly favorable

of legitimate same-gender marriages entered into in other states”); Ivey DeJesus, Gay,
Lesbian Couples File Lawsuit Challenging Pennsylvania Marriage Law, PENN LIVE (July 9,
2013, 10:00 PM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2013/07/same-sex_marriage
_gay_marriage.html; Frank Green, Class-Action Suit Challenges Va.’s Same-Sex Marriage
Ban, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 1, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.timesdispatch.com
/news/state-regional/ap/another-federal-suit-challenges-va-gay-marriage-ban/article
_b8b797ea-fa88-11e2-a17c-001a4bcf6878.html; Jessie Halladay, Couple Challenges
Kentucky Law Against Gay Marriage, USA Today (July 26, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.usa
today.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/26/same-sex-marriage-kentucky/2589379; see also
Matthew Brown, Overstock Executive Launches Campaign to Amend Utah Constitution over
Religious Liberty, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013 1:10 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com
/article/865584444/Overstock-executive-launches-campaign-to-amend-Utah-Constitution
-over-religious-liberty.html (reporting on a new multistate campaign to exempt religious
organizations, and potentially secular businesses from recognizing same-sex marriages).
21. See generally THOMAS M. MESSNER, HERITAGE FOUND., SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND
THE THREAT TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, NO. 2201 (2008), available at http://www.heritage.org
/research/reports/2008/10/same-sex-marriage-and-the-threat-to-religious-liberty; Laycock,
supra note 7.
22. See Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 26, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human
-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx.
23. See, e.g., Assemb. 1, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012); Assemb. B. 19,
Assemb., 2005–2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
24. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 650-A (2012).
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to gay rights; although sixteen states and the District of Columbia currently allow same26
sex marriage,25 twenty-nine states have constitutional bars against it.
Nonetheless, a remarkable change in public opinion suggests access to same-sex
marriage will continue to expand. In 2011, for the first time a majority of
27
Americans said that same-sex marriage should be legalized. The shift has
28
occurring rapidly, with support rising from 37% to 58% over the last decade.
Faced with potential reform, some religious adherents object that marriage
equality represents a threat to their religious liberty, forcing them to participate in
same-sex marriage. They describe objections that fall into three categories. The
first category relates to performing or licensing marriages. With legalization of
same-sex marriage, couples will require marriage licenses and officiating from
29
public officials. Some, like the clerks in New York and Massachusetts who
resigned rather than issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, may raise
30
religious objections.
The second category of objections concerns goods and services for weddings.
Caterers, bakers, florists, and other commercial enterprises involved in wedding
ceremonies may seek to withhold their services out of religious opposition to same31
sex marriage. The experience of Elane Photography, a business in New Mexico
that was sued for refusing to photograph a lesbian couple’s commitment ceremony,
figures prominently as an example of such a conflict used by proponents of broad
32
religious exemptions. Another frequently cited case is Bernstein v. Ocean Grove
33
Camp Meeting Ass’n, in which the Methodist ministry organization that owns the
town of Ocean Grove, New Jersey, rejected a lesbian couple’s request to reserve a

25. Gay Marriage in the U.S.: A Look at States Which Allow Same-Sex Couples to Wed,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 20, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/21/gay
-marriage-across-the-nation_n_4313018.html.
26. Defining Marriage, supra note 22 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
27. See Frank Newport, Half of Americans Support Legal Gay Marriage, GALLUP
POLITICS (May 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154529/half-americans-support-legal
-gay-marriage.aspx.
28. Same-Sex Marriage, Gay Rights—ABC News/Wash. Post Poll, Mar. 7–10, 2013,
POLLINGREPORT.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
29. Laycock, supra note 7, at 194–95. Despite frequent claims that legalization of samesex marriage will require clergy or religious organizations to perform marriages in violation
of their beliefs, these concerns are unfounded. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at A16 (reporting that twelve justices of the peace resigned in
Massachusetts); Thomas Kaplan, Rights Collide as Town Clerk Sidesteps Role in Gay
Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at A1 (reporting that in New York, two clerks
resigned and one appointed a deputy to issue licenses by appointment for gay couples).
31. See, e.g., Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, No. 11-1-3103-12 ECN, 2013 WL
1614105 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2013) (order granting summary judgment in favor of
same-sex couple refused service at a bed and breakfast).
32. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
33. No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. Div. on Civ. Rights Dec. 29, 2008).
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pavilion on the boardwalk for their civil union. Recently, numerous reports have
34
surfaced of bakeries and dress shops refusing to serve same-sex couples.
The third category applies to acknowledging a same-sex marriage as valid and
treating persons in same-sex marriages equally in employment and the delivery of
goods and services. Same-sex married couples will require third parties to
recognize their married status for purposes of employee benefits, insurance,
35
hospital visitation, medical decision making, litigation, and more. Housing
similarly could be implicated, as when Yeshiva University’s Albert Einstein
College of Medicine faced a discrimination suit for its exclusion of unmarried
couples from married student housing, which effectively discriminated against gay
36
students.
More broadly, supporters of wide-ranging religious exemptions identify a set of
commercial actors and social service providers (religiously affiliated and not) that
seek to refuse to deal with same-sex couples in areas unrelated to marriage. In one
37
case, Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, the country’s largest adoption website
prohibited a gay couple in a registered domestic partnership from posting a profile
as prospective parents, based on a position that “it is in the best interests of infants
38
to be placed for adoption with a married mother and father.” In a similar vein,
Catholic Charities of Boston withdrew from providing adoption services, rather
39
than continue to permit adoption by gays. Refusals by professionals, like
therapists and doctors, to offer their services to same-sex couples also are employed
40
as examples. North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego

34. See, e.g., Katie McDonough, Oregon Baker Denies Lesbian Couple a Wedding
Cake, SALON (Feb. 4, 2013, 11:55 AM EST), http://www.salon.com/2013/02/04/oregon
_baker_denies_lesbian_couple_a_wedding_cake/; Katie McDonough, Yet Another Bakery
Refuses to Make Cake for Gay Wedding, SALON (May 15, 2013, 11:51 AM EDT), http://
www.salon.com/2013/05/15/yet_another_bakery_refuses_cake_for_gay_wedding/?utm
_source=feedly; Mark Meredith & Will C. Holden, Cake Shop Says Business Booming Since
Refusal to Serve Gay Couple, FOX 31 DENVER (July 31, 2012, 8:54 AM), http://kdvr.com
/2012/07/30/denver-cake-shop-refuses-service-to-gay-couple/; Nina Terrero, N.J. Bridal
Shop Refused to Sell Wedding Dress to Lesbian Bride: Owner Says: “That’s Illegal,” ABC
NEWS (Aug. 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nj-bridal-shop-refused-sell-wedding-dress
-lesbian/story?id=14342333#.UZqtN7Wkrlw; Wedding Cake Battle Brews Between Couple,
Baker, KCCI NEWS 8 (Nov. 12, 2011, 9:37 AM CST), http://www.kcci.com/Wedding-Cake
-Battle-Brews-Between-Couple-Baker/-/9357770/7310176/-/fwbjaw/-/index.html.
35. Laycock, supra note 7, at 195.
36. See Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001) (finding same-sex couple
had sufficiently pled that such a policy violated New York City law against sexual
orientation discrimination).
37. 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
38. Id. at 1057.
39. See Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOS. GLOBE,
Mar. 11, 2006, at A1.
40. See Stern, supra note 7, at 22–24. Several cases involve denial of counseling
services due to counselors’ religious objections. See, e.g., Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2012); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th
Cir. 2012); Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011); Bruff v. N. Miss.
Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001).
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41

County Superior Court, involving a medical practice that refused to perform an
42
intrauterine insemination for a lesbian, is often discussed.
Although many religious objectors continue to oppose marriage equality
altogether, when faced with the prospect of its enactment they demand
accommodation of their religious beliefs. Otherwise, across these three categories,
objecting individuals and businesses could be exposed to antidiscrimination suits,
43
restricted from government funding, or denied tax-exempt status.
At this point, it may be helpful to set the limits of the discussion of religious
accommodation. First, in no instance would legalization of same-sex marriage
force clergy to officiate weddings of which their religion disapproves or require
44
houses of worship to open their doors to such weddings. Given the autonomy of
churches in their internal affairs protected by the Free Exercise Clause, no genuine
45
legal dispute exists with regard to churches performing religious marriages.
Churches and clergy, therefore, will not be discussed here, although commercial
actors affiliated with religious organizations will be considered. Second, with the
issue of religious marriage off the table, it is generally agreed that the First
Amendment neither prohibits nor requires exemptions to neutral and generally
46
applicable laws. The debate, therefore, has turned to whether, and how, to craft
47
legislative exemptions for those with moral or religious objections. It is in this
context that legal scholars have entered the fray.
B. Antidiscrimination Exemptions or
Conscientious Objection as the Legal Framework?
The scholarly literature reflects a fundamental disagreement over the legal
framework for accommodating religious objection. Broadly speaking, the debate

41. 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
42. See Berg, supra note 7, at 209.
43. See Severino, supra note 7, at 957–58 (predicting “punishment for violating
antidiscrimination laws in employment, housing, public accommodations . . . due to an
organization following its conscience regarding same-sex marriage”); Berg et al. N.H. Ltr.,
supra note 8, at 3.
44. Stern, supra note 7, at 1 (“No one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or
even asked, to perform marriages that are anathema to them.”).
45. Indeed, in legalizing marriage equality, legislators have reaffirmed their recognition
of church autonomy in this area. For example, Vermont’s statute stipulates that it “does not
require a member of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage . . . , and any refusal to do
so shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5144(b)
(2012).
46. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); see also Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (“Our cases do not at the farthest reach support the proposition that
a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a
democratic government.”).
47. I do not deal here with the application of state and federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts (RFRAs). The federal RFRA does not apply to states, City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and, therefore, like the First Amendment, is not discussed in
this context. Note also that later-enacted marriage equality or antidiscrimination legislation
may supersede RFRAs.
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focuses on antidiscrimination law or conscientious objector protection. With regard
to race, gender, and most recently sexual orientation, our society has addressed
conflicts between religion and equality through antidiscrimination law. Here too,
any accommodation of religious objections would require amendments to laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public
accommodations, housing, and employment. A group of law and religion scholars,
however, resists this characterization. They instead adopt the position that marriage
is an exceptional act, justifying protection of conscientious objection, or so-called
marriage conscience protection. They attempt to insert marriage into a tradition of
conscientious objection to war, execution, and abortion. Through scholarship and
advocacy, they have moved the conscientious objector framework to the forefront
of debates over religious liberty and marriage equality.
On the antidiscrimination side, scholars—including William Eskridge, Douglas
NeJaime, Chai Feldblum, and Taylor Flynn—argue that accommodation of
religious objections to equality norms has long been analyzed under the rubric of
antidiscrimination law. As Eskridge says, “There is nothing new about civil
equality-religious liberty clashes.”48 Historically, as now, religious opposition
emerged in response to race, religion, or gender nondiscrimination requirements.49
In particular, outcry around interracial marriage followed a pattern much like that
of objections to same-sex marriage. Objectors contended that religious beliefs
specific to marriage—not biases based on status—were at work.50 Moreover, the
same arguments now made about marriage, which describe marriage as an act
rather than a status and as a question of liberty rather than equality, were repeatedly
made against sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws and the decriminalization
of homosexual sex.51
Despite attempts to resurrect a distinction between sexual conduct and sexual
orientation status, religious resistance to same-sex marriage threatens the same
antidiscrimination norms that religious objections to interracial marriage and sexual
orientation discrimination laws did. In those states legalizing marriage equality,
sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws already address those acts that are cited

48. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status,
Belief, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 660 (2011).
49. See generally id. (noting similarities between these arguments and racial
discrimination); Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights
Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007) (identifying similarities between religious objections to
gender and sexual orientation antidiscrimination norms).
50. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on
Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2736 (2008)
(“[B]oth antimiscegenation statutes and bans against same-sex marriage have been used to
construct and reify essentialized and dualistic understandings of race and sex/gender.”); Greg
Johnson, We’ve Heard This Before: The Legacy of Interracial Marriage Bans and the
Implications for Today’s Marriage Equality Debates, 34 VT. L. REV. 277, 279 (2009)
(arguing that cases upholding bans on interracial marriage accepted arguments like those
against same-sex marriage); Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison
of Mixed-Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 255, 256 (2002)
(arguing that both gay and interracial couples suffered similar sexualization of their
marriages).
51. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 13, at 241; Gilreath, supra note 13, at 207.
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as examples of religious objections to same-sex marriage. As NeJaime argues,
“Marriage is merely one form of sexual orientation identity enactment, and
religious objections to same-sex marriage are merely a subset of objections to
sexual orientation equality.”52
Indeed, purported objections to the act of same-sex marriage involve—almost
exclusively—resistance to sexual orientation nondiscrimination obligations.53 For
example, the withdrawal of Catholic Charities from adoption services in
Massachusetts (and calls to exempt adoption providers) stemmed from the
application of sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws, well before same-sex
marriage was legalized.54 Claimed rights of employers to refuse gays spousal
benefits similarly implicate antidiscrimination protections—not marriage per se.
Any claimed accommodation of such objections thus comes within the purpose,
structure, and message of antidiscrimination law.55
Situating the debate within antidiscrimination law does not preclude religious
exemptions. Across categories of race, sex, religion, and sexual orientation,
antidiscrimination law has proved capable of balancing interests in religious liberty
and equality in a nuanced way.
It should come as no surprise then that a number of scholars embrace both the
antidiscrimination framework and religious exemptions.56 For example, both
William Eskridge and Martha Minow urge considering religious exemptions with
regard to gender and sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws.57 Chai Feldblum
advocates for exemptions for enterprises that seek to enroll individuals who want to
be inculcated with antigay beliefs (which could include schools and religious
camps) and for leadership positions in social services run by religious institutions.58
Alan Brownstein argues that the example of religious discrimination offers an
appropriate solution. He proposes that where antidiscrimination law permits
individuals or, more likely, institutions to discriminate on the basis of religion, so
too should it exempt them from involvement with or recognition of same-sex
marriage.59

52.
53.
54.
55.

NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1169.
See Flynn, supra note 13, at 247; see also NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1179.
See infra Part IV.
See generally Angela C. Carmella, Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1731 (2011); Feldblum, supra note 13; Flynn, supra note 13; Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 13, at 291–93; NeJaime, supra note 13; Strasser, supra note 13; Gilreath,
supra note 13.
56. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination
Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125,
131–35 (2006); NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1179–80.
57. Eskridge, supra note 48, at 715 (endorsing “Martha Minow’s suggestion that the
gay-friendly state go out of its way to accommodate religion, so long as religion is willing to
meet the state halfway”); Minow, supra note 49, at 847 (arguing for compromise from civil
rights advocates to provide religious groups with “avenues for accommodation”).
58. Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK.
L. REV. 61, 121–22 (2006).
59. Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for
Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to
Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389, 425 (2010).
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On the other side of the debate, Laycock, Wilson, Berg, Stern, Garnett, and
Esbeck frame the issue in terms of conscientious objection. Some government
actors and business people, they say, may “feel that they are being asked to
promote or facilitate sin in a way that makes them personally responsible for the sin
that ensues.”60 Speaking in one voice in advocacy to state legislators, they assert
that, “assisting with a marriage ceremony has religious significance that
commercial services, like serving burgers and driving taxis, simply do not. [Those
who refuse] have no objection generally to providing services, but they object to
directly facilitating a marriage.”61 In this sense, objection to same-sex marriage is
driven, not by the status of the couple as gay, but by objectors’ desire not to
participate in an act that will threaten their own moral integrity. Same-sex
marriage, these scholars say, creates “a cruel choice” for religious objectors: “your
conscience or your livelihood.”62 At stake, says Laycock, is the “religious liberty of
those religious believers who cannot conscientiously participate in implementing
the new regime.”63
Based on this understanding, the Laycock-Wilson group urges the adoption of
marriage conscience protection (MCP), which treats the refusal to serve same-sex
couples as “conscientious objection” to the exceptional act of marriage. These
scholars propose allowing refusal from public employees, religiously affiliated
organizations, and small secular businesses and individuals engaged in commerce.
Under MCP, none of these three categories of actors could be “penalized or denied
benefits under the laws of this state or any subdivision of this state, including but
not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public
accommodations, licensing, government grants or contracts, or tax-exempt
status.”64
First, public employees or officials could refuse to provide marriage-related
government services.65 Their refusal, however, would be contingent on another

60. Laycock, supra note 7, at 195.
61. Wilson et al. N.Y. Ltr., supra note 8, at 14 (emphasis omitted); see also Severino,
supra note 7, at 958 (arguing that religious organizations can “live with anti-discrimination
laws” but not same-sex marriage).
62. Wilson et al. N.Y. Ltr., supra note 8, at 13.
63. Laycock Conn. Ltr., supra note 8, at 1; see also Berg, supra note 7, at 207 (“It is
likely in the future that religious dissenters, organizations, and individuals, will more
frequently face a Hobson’s choice between facilitating same-sex marriages against their
conscience and giving up their charitable activities or small businesses.”); Wilson et al. Md.
Ltr., supra note 8, at 9 (“Church-affiliated organizations can have their tax exempt status
stripped because of their conscientious objection” to offering goods or facilities to same-sex
couples.).
64. Berg et al. Conn. Letter, supra note 8, at 7–8.
65. The proposal reads:
[I]n the case of an individual who is a government employee or official, if
another government employee or official is not promptly available and willing
to provide the requested government service without inconvenience or delay;
provided that no judicial officer authorized to solemnize marriages shall be
required to solemnize any marriage if to do so would violate the judicial
officer’s sincerely held religious beliefs.
Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3–4 (emphasis in original). There is scholarly
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employee being available to provide the service “without inconvenience or
delay.”66 Couples initially could be refused a license by a city clerk, but ultimately
would receive one.
Second, religious organizations, including commercial actors connected to a
religious organization, could refuse to solemnize a marriage; to “provide services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related
to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage”; and to treat as valid any
marriage.67 The definition of religious organization sweeps in all commercial
activity affiliated with a religious group, including landlords, adoption agencies,
insurance companies, hospitals, and employers. With regard to these religiously
affiliated businesses, the proposed right to refuse is absolute. Throughout their
married life, a couple could be denied adoption, social services, housing, and
spousal leave and benefits.
Third, individuals and secular businesses could also refuse goods and services.
While previous proposals would have exempted any business that objects,68 the
current iteration of MCP applies to businesses (1) where the owner primarily
performs the services, (2) that employ five or fewer employees, or (3) that own five
or fewer units of housing for rent.69 Individuals and these small businesses could
refuse to provide couples with goods and services for weddings, employee benefits
for spouses, housing, and “counseling or other services that directly facilitate the
perpetuation of any marriage.”70 The term “facilitate” arguably sweeps in
businesses and individuals that might be expected to acknowledge a couple’s
married status or treat same-sex couples equally to opposite-sex couples at any time
in their married lives. Wilson, for example, suggests carve-outs for state-funded
adoption placement, spousal leave from employment, and spousal visiting
privileges at hospitals as potential areas for exemption.71 Under MCP, these
individuals and businesses may inconvenience and delay same-sex couples, but
must yield if a party to the marriage is “unable to obtain any similar good or
services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere without substantial
hardship.”72
The choice then is between MCP’s conscientious objection framework and
religious accommodation within the antidiscrimination framework. It is precisely
accommodation in the antidiscrimination framework that MCP proponents resist. It
therefore is worth noting some ways in which MCP fundamentally diverges from

disagreement even in the marriage exceptionalism camp regarding this exemption. See, e.g.,
Laycock, supra note 7, at 199 (“Government employees cannot have more than de minimis
rights to refuse to perform their core job functions for all members of the public, and
probably most courts would not even concede a de minimis right.”).
66. Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3.
67. Id.
68. Stern, supra note 7, at 308 (admitting that the original proposal “is ambiguous on
some points,” which raises questions like “are individuals who do business in corporate form
protected (and, if so, what size corporations would be protected)?”).
69. See supra note 10 for proposed statutory text.
70. Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3.
71. Wilson, supra note 7, at 100.
72. Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3.
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the approach antidiscrimination law has historically taken to balancing equality and
religious liberty.73
As an initial matter, the label of conscientious objection focuses on the act of
marriage itself, not discrimination based on status or other law breaking.74 It cabins
the debate to the act of same-sex marriage and seeks to avoid comparisons to race
or sex discrimination. In separate scholarly writing and joint advocacy, MCP
proponents thus reject the view that objections to marriage are in actuality
discrimination against same-sex couples.75 They argue that same-sex marriage—in
contraposition to antidiscrimination obligations—imposes unique burdens on
public and private actors.76 On this account, religious opponents of same-sex
marriage are conscientious objectors refusing to cede to legal coercion. Marriage
becomes an act with great moral peril. By contrast, although antidiscrimination
laws vary, they share the view of exemptions as authorizing discrimination.
Objectors do not assert views specific to an exceptional act of marriage; rather, they
seek to discriminate against couples (or individuals) based on their status.
This initial difference leads to conclusions about the scope of acceptable
exemptions. MCP in the model of medical conscientious objection is expansive.
Due to its focus on marriage as a sui generis act, MCP extends protection across
contexts and to individuals and institutions, whether secular, religiously affiliated,
or public. Balancing religion and other societal values becomes irrelevant under the
MCP analysis. It does not consider intimacy, alternate religious views, or, generally
speaking, access to services. Unlike antidiscrimination law, MCP does not weigh
the effect of individual objection on institutional interests. Objecting employees
would receive a blanket exemption without any consideration of the employer’s
concerns, as they often do under the medical model from which MCP borrows.
Large religiously affiliated commercial actors receive carte blanche to discriminate,
irrespective of any effects on access to services.
By contrast, exemptions within antidiscrimination legislation—of any kind—
have been relatively narrow.77 Antidiscrimination law also typically does not
countenance exemptions for secular businesses engaged in commerce and open to
the public. The rental companies, dress shops, and limo businesses that assert
objections are prototypical public accommodations, required to serve customers
and treat employees without discrimination.78 Businesses serving the public and

73. See NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1189–95, for a more comprehensive evaluation of
sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws that MCP would affect.
74. See Eskridge, supra note 48, at 662 (observing that litigation seeking exemptions
from sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws attempted to draw a distinction between
discrimination based on conduct and status and that “religion-based discrimination against
African-Americans was premised upon the same kind of thinking”).
75. See, e.g., Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 15 (arguing that objection “arises
not from anti-gay animus, but from a sincere religious belief in traditional marriage”).
76. See supra note 7 for examples of scholarly writing and note 8 for joint letters.
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2006) (outlining exemptions within Fair Housing Act).
78. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 13, at 238 (noting “the common law’s determination that
in a clash between a seller’s asserted rights or beliefs and her provision of services to a
willing buyer, the burden should fall on the seller who has placed herself in the public
marketplace”).
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affiliated
with
religious
organizations—like
hospitals—also
have
nondiscrimination obligations as public accommodations.79 And public institutions
must always comply with antidiscrimination obligations.
Antidiscrimination law also balances a multitude of interests in crafting
exemptions, including: the private or public character of an entity, the intimacy of
relationships, the role of religious institutions, and access to commercial
transactions.80 It evaluates exemptions differently according to the context (housing
or public accommodation, for example) and the institution involved. Take religious
individuals. Under antidiscrimination law, clergy (and churches) and public
employees are easy cases—the private or public nature is determinative.81 A public
official typically cannot refuse to marry a Jew and a non-Jew, whereas a rabbi
could so refuse. Religious individuals also are entitled to accommodation from
their employer, provided it does not create an undue hardship for the employer.82
Exemptions in the antidiscrimination model are linked to the identity of the
would-be discriminator and its role in society. Thus, the commercial transactions of
a business, despite any perceived religious mission, bring it within the rubric of a
public accommodation subject to antidiscrimination laws.83 Although some statutes
authorize religiously affiliated nonprofits to discriminate in employment in favor of
coadherents, they generally do so in a limited way.84 And, to the extent exemptions
exist for secular businesses, they are not justified by religion but interests in
intimacy, family life, or practical burden. For instance, the Fair Housing Act

79. NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1192 (compiling statutes); Kelly Catherine Chapman,
Note, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to
Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1789–90 (2012) (“States that
currently have such statutes generally have minimal religious exemptions . . . . These include
exemptions for actual places of religious worship, the organizations they operate, and certain
private organizations.”).
80. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (upholding a state
antidiscrimination law applied to a private organization engaged in “public, quasicommercial conduct”); Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ¶ 16, 61 P.3d 989, 995
(maintaining that Title VII’s small business exception protects the “intimate relationships
associated with small employers”); Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. & Marion Morris, Fair
Housing Legislation, Not an Easy Row to Hoe, 4 CITYSCAPE 21, 25 (1999) (discussing the
Fair Housing Act’s “Mrs. Murphy” exemption, which exempts individual homeowners with
four or fewer units who do not use a real estate agent from the law).
81. Statutes typically exempt “religious organizations,” defined to include churches,
synagogues, mosques, and sometimes schools. NeJaime, supra note 13, at 1191–92 &
nn.74–83.
82. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986).
83. See, e.g., Pines v. Tomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
Christian Yellow Pages publisher had business-like attributes and was a public
accommodation, notwithstanding the fact that it operated under aegis of nonprofit religious
corporation).
84. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2006) (exempting from “a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals
of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities”); see also NeJaime, supra
note 13, at 1191–94.
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excludes rentals in dwellings with four or fewer units when the owner lives in one
of the units.85 The concern is for the intimacy of inviting strangers into one’s
dwelling.86 Similarly, some employment discrimination statutes—including several
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination87—excuse small businesses (from two
to fifteen employees) from compliance, in recognition of the cost of litigation and
potential effect on family businesses.88
Given these differences, the divide over theoretical frameworks has significant
practical implications. Whether MCP or antidiscrimination prevails will determine
whether we view refusals as conscientious objection or discrimination. It will
influence whether a variety of interests are weighed or marriage is treated as an
exceptional act. Ultimately, it may determine the survival of a large cross-section of
antidiscrimination laws.
II. MEDICINE AS THE MODEL FOR MARRIAGE CONSCIENCE PROTECTION
Protection of conscientious objection has been limited, historically, to serving as
a soldier in war, participating in the imposition or execution of the death penalty,
and, more recently, providing abortions and other controversial medical
treatments.89 The status of conscientious objector is most closely linked to
individuals opposed to military service.90 It implies willingness to bear a heavy
burden, rather than contribute to the law’s immoral project.
MCP proponents seek to include same-sex marriage within this universe of
protection of conscientious objection. They rely on the theoretical premise that
commercial actors’ objections to same-sex marriage are equivalent to doctors’

85. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (2006); see also id. § 2000a(b)(1) (exempting lodging for
transient guests in “an establishment located within a building which contains not more than
five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such
establishment as his residence”).
86. Rigel C. Oliveri, Discriminatory Housing Advertisements On-Line: Lessons from
Craigslist, 43 IND. L. REV. 1125, 1135–37 (2010) (discussing origins of the “Mrs. Murphy
exemption” to the Fair Housing Act and the focus on the intimate, personal nature of living
side-by-side with boarders).
87. See JEROME HUNT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A STATE-BY-STATE EXAMINATION OF
NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES (2012), available at http://www.american
progress.org/issues/2012/06/pdf/state_nondiscrimination.pdf (listing state sexual orientation
antidiscrimination statutes and their numerosity requirements, if any).
88. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446–47 (2003)
(observing intent to spare small firms the high cost of compliance); Richard Carlson, The
Small Firm Exemption and the Single Employer Doctrine in Employment Discrimination
Law, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1197, 1262–64 (2006) (observing importance of protecting
personal relations within a small firm).
89. Erica J. Sutton & Ross E.G. Upshur, Are There Different Spheres of Conscience?,
16 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 338, 340 (2010) (“Conscientious objection is the phrase
that consistently frames the arguments involving health care providers.”).
90. A November 1, 2013, Westlaw search of Supreme Court cases returns forty-four
conscientious objection cases, thirty-six of which involve war or execution, two of which
involve abortion. A search of courts of appeals decisions also results in almost exclusive
reference to military service and the death penalty.
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refusals to perform controversial procedures, abortions in particular. The unique
structure of medical conscience legislation—which protects medical providers and
facilities that refuse to provide particular controversial procedures for religious,
moral, or ethical reasons—then becomes the appropriate practical model for
marriage. The experience of medical legislation, MCP scholars argue, offers
relevant and important lessons for the debate over marriage equality.
Robin Fretwell Wilson, the central proponent of the medical model, says, “It is
difficult to ignore the parallels emerging between same-sex marriage and the
recently renewed debates about the limits of conscience in healthcare.”91 Other
pro-MCP scholars explicitly or implicitly adopt the medical model in their own
writing.92 Thomas Berg, for example, says that objection to same-sex marriage “fits
comfortably with the widely accepted ‘conscience clauses’ that protect refusal to
participate in or directly facilitate an abortion, another specific form of conduct.”93
Proposing a middle path, Ian Bartrum notes that “we might see the same-sex
marriage issue as somewhat closer to the controversy over abortion, where we
exempt service providers with religious objections.”94 Opponents of MCP also have
been forced to engage with this premise.95
Wilson and other pro-exemption scholars make three links between same-sex
marriage and medicine (with a focus on abortion). First and most obviously, like
abortion, same-sex marriage is politically fraught and evokes religious and moral
convictions. Second, marriages or weddings, like medical procedures, require
performance by or involvement of third parties (such as officiants and vendors).
Conflicts in this area, Wilson says, “parallel the disputes between private
physicians who do not want to perform abortions, and private patients who want

91. Wilson, supra note 7, at 77.
92. Laycock, supra note 7, at 198 (“Robin Wilson proposes what seems to me a much
more sensible balance: to protect the right of conscientious objectors to refuse to facilitate
same-sex marriages, except where such a refusal imposes significant hardship on the
same-sex couple.”); Brownstein, supra note 59, at 414 n.76 (observing that MCP advocates
“do not necessarily press the healthcare analogy in their work but support essentially the
same framework”); Geoffrey Trotter, The Right to Decline Performance of Same-Sex Civil
Marriages: The Duty to Accommodate Public Servants—A Response to Professor Bruce
MacDougall, 70 SASK. L. REV. 365, 370–75 (2007) (arguing that accommodating objection
to providing same-sex marriage services “is akin to conscience protections granted to doctors
and nurses”).
93. Berg, supra note 7, at 233; see also Carmella, supra note 55, at 1745–49
(contending that same-sex marriage exemptions fall within the same framework as abortion
and contraception); Stern, supra note 7, at 315 (linking abortion and marriage).
94. Ian C. Bartrum, Commentary, Same-Sex Marriage in the Heartland: The Case for
Legislative Minimalism in Crafting Religious Exemptions, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 8, 10 (2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/bartrum.pdf.
95. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 291–93 (arguing that medical conscience
legislation is not convincing precedent because of the nature of abortion, which involves the
taking of human life); Strasser, supra note 13, at 11–19, 29–33 (describing and critiquing
abortion analogy); Robin Fretwell Wilson & Jana Singer, Same-Sex Marriage and
Conscience Exemptions, 12 ENGAGE 12, 17 (2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20110912
_WilsonSingerEngage12.2.pdf (Singer briefly addressing and rejecting medical provider
analogy in debate with Wilson).
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one.”96 On this analysis, religious objectors claim only a negative right to conduct
business as they see fit, whereas same-sex couples seek a positive entitlement to
assistance by others.97 Third and most significantly, MCP proponents claim that
both the medical and marriage contexts involve participation in exceptional acts.
For a physician, the rationale for objection purportedly is the physician’s
participation or complicity in a discrete act she judges to be morally bad—not the
status of the person seeking care. Indeed, medical providers are not privileged to
deny care to people based on invidious discrimination.98 With regard to marriage,
florists, bakers, and caterers then can be seen as like the archetypal doctor who
holds as a moral matter that abortion is killing, an immoral act from which he must
absolutely abstain. Indeed, Wilson characterizes “the duty not to facilitate
[marriage as] an absolute” for these objectors.99
The conscientious objection framework is instrumentally valuable because it
moves the discussion away from discrimination. By its nature, it focuses on a
specific act. The contested act, rather than those affected by the invocation of
conscience, stands at the center of any inquiry. Terming refusal to serve same-sex
couples “conscientious objection” also attempts to sidestep comparisons to race,
gender, or miscegenation discrimination.
The alleged theoretical equivalency between abortion and same-sex marriage
leads to the Laycock-Wilson group’s legislative proposal. They seek to bring
marriage under a recognized exception—namely, medical conscience legislation,
which protects providers who refuse to participate in controversial medical
procedures. In joint advocacy, they quote at length from medical conscience
legislation.100 They indicate that federal laws allowing conscientious objections to
participation in military service and performance of abortions and sterilizations
constitute precedent for their proposal.101
Medical conscience statutes were first enacted to ensure medical providers could
refuse to perform or participate in abortion if it “would be contrary to [their]
religious beliefs or moral convictions.”102 Later, these statutes extended virtually
uniformly across states to the withholding and withdrawal of life support.103 The
stated goal was protecting medical providers’ consciences. In recent years, some
states have further expanded the reach of conscience legislation to contraception

96. Wilson, supra note 7, at 100.
97. See id. at 80; Laycock, supra note 7, at 192 (endorsing this formulation).
98. Conscience clauses, however, may be invoked in a discriminatory way (for instance,
to deny contraception to unmarried women).
99. Wilson, supra note 7, at 101 (emphasis in original).
100. Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 6 n.12.
101. Id. at 6.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2006) (passed in 1973).
103. Martha S. Swartz, “Conscience Clauses” or “Unconscionable Clauses”: Personal
Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 269,
282–83 (2006); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(b) (LexisNexis 2006) (“No nurse, physician,
or other health care provider may be required by law or contract in any circumstances to
participate in the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if such person
objects to so doing.”).
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and fertility care.104 In several states, legislation now applies not only to
participating in or performing a procedure but also to giving information or
referring for care.105
Medical conscience legislation also applies to a wide array of medical facilities.
Entire hospitals, healthcare systems, clinics, or practice groups may refuse
contested treatments.106 By contrast to limited exemptions in antidiscrimination
laws, legislation typically does not differentiate between religious and secular,
public and private, and for-profit and not-for-profit institutions.107
This conscience legislation covers three distinct conflicts. First, employers must
accommodate doctors and nurses who refuse to participate in certain procedures.
Under pain of civil or criminal penalties,108 employers may not discriminate against
those who decline to provide certain treatments when making hiring, promotion,
and firing decisions.109 By contrast, an employer that opposes controversial
procedures may require doctors and nurses to comply with restrictions on care even
if they disagree with the employer. Second, providers are immunized from civil or
criminal liability or professional discipline if they harm patients through their
refusal.110 Third, the state must accept refusing individuals and institutions into
government programs and extend funds to them on equal terms to those medical
providers that deliver all necessary care.111
The unique scope of conscientious objection protection in medicine makes it an
appealing model for pro-MCP scholars. Unlike protection of the refusal of a draftee
to fight in war or a government employee to participate in executions, medical

104. State Policies in Brief: Refusing to Provide Health Services, GUTTMACHER
INSTITUTE (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf
(contraception in 13 states).
105. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.31(B) (2008) (extending to refusal to
“recommend or counsel an abortion”).
106. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154(a) (Supp. 2012); 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 70/9 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-7(1) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22410 (2011).
107. A handful limit institutional conscience clauses to private institutions, ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-16-304 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-34-104(5) (West 2011). Several others limit institutional conscience protections to
religious institutions, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65 (West 2007); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 123420(c) (West 2012).
108. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2012) (violation of
conscience clause a misdemeanor); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/1(c) (West 2010)
(violation resulting in “civil damages equal to 3 times the amount of proved damages”).
109. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(c), (e) (2006).
110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(C)(1) (2009) (“[H]ealth care provider is not
subject to criminal or civil liability or professional discipline for . . . [f]ailing to comply with
a decision or a direction that violates the provider’s conscience . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:65A-3 (West 2000) (“The refusal to perform, assist in the performance of, or provide
abortion services or sterilization procedures shall not constitute grounds for civil or criminal
liability, disciplinary action or discriminatory treatment.”).
111. See 42 U.S.C. §300a-7(b) (2006) (preventing “any court or any public official or
other public authority” from imposing any requirements to participate in sterilization or
abortion in violation of religious or moral beliefs).
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conscience legislation extends to market relationships between businesses and
consumers, social services and clients, and employers and employees. It gives
individuals and—in a radical departure from other conscience protection—business
entities grounds to violate institutional or legal norms without consequence.
Nowhere else is the burden directly imposed on individuals (patients) and private
institutions (employers and health facilities), instead of on the state and public at
large.112 Unlike the draft context, conscientious objectors in healthcare shoulder no
alternate burdens.113
The MCP proposal of Wilson, Laycock, Berg, Esbeck, Stern, and Garnett adopts
this structure, exempting institutions and individuals from requirements usually
imposed on public accommodations, employers, and landlords. Both public and
private employers would be required to accommodate individual employees who
object to same-sex marriage. Religious organizations, small businesses, and
professionals would be relieved of certain obligations of nondiscrimination and
would avoid legal liability. Moreover, the state would be prohibited from
withholding government funding based on their refusal. The burden of MCP would
fall on same-sex couples and individuals and entities supportive of same-sex
marriage.
Marriage conscience protection modeled on medicine has had some traction in
the political arena. In Iowa, the Religious Conscience Protection Act would have
allowed individuals and businesses to discriminate against same-sex couples in
delivering goods and services connected with a same-sex marriage ceremony,
adoption or reproductive services, spousal benefits, and housing.114 New
Hampshire legislators proposed amending its marriage equality act to allow any
business to refuse to provide goods or services to any wedding on grounds of
conscience.115 In both Maryland and Connecticut, some senators urged the adoption
of MCP.116
While no state has enacted the proposal in full, several have adopted narrower
versions. New York, Vermont, and New Hampshire allow religious entities to
refuse to provide “services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or
privileges” relating to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage.117 Beyond the

112. The burden of objection to the draft falls only indirectly on potential draftees
through a marginally greater risk of conscription, rather than specific individuals. See
Geoffrey Stone, Civil Unions: A Response to Garnett and Laycock, UNIV. CHI. LAW SCH.
FACULTY BLOG (May 5, 2009, 11:29 PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/05
/civil-unions-a-response-to-garnett-and-laycock.html.
113. Cf. Adam J. Kolber, Alternative Burdens on Freedom of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 919, 930 (2010); Ronald A. Lindsay, When to Grant Conscientious Objector Status,
AM. J. BIOETHICS, June 2007, at 25, 25–26.
114. H. Study B. 50, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011).
115. Kevin Landrigan, Bill Would Let Wedding Vendors Refuse Service to Engaged
Same-Sex Couples, NASHUA TELEGRAPH (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.nashuatelegraph.com
/newsstatenewengland/947843-227/bill-lets-some-conscientiously-object-to-gay.html.
116. Conn. S. Debate on S.B. 899, 2009 Gen. Assemb. (Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Michael McLachlan); Julie Bolcer, Senate Says Yes to Marry-Land, ADVOCATE.COM (Feb.
23, 2012, 5:35 PM), http://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2012/02/23/senate-says-yes
-marry-land.
117. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b
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marriage ceremony, Vermont exempts fraternal organizations from providing
insurance.118 New Hampshire permits religious organizations and their employees
to decline to provide “services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or
privileges . . . related to . . . the promotion of marriage through religious
counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing designated for married
individuals.”119 Connecticut goes a step further, ensuring that legalization of
marriage for same-sex couples shall not “affect the manner in which a religious
organization may provide adoption, foster care or social services if such religious
organization does not receive state or federal funds for that specific program or
purpose.”120 In recognizing civil unions, Rhode Island came closest to the MCP
model. Legislators chose to allow religious organizations, including hospitals,
schools, and community centers, to refuse to “treat as valid any civil union.”121 The
exemption stopped short, however, of allowing private individuals or secular
businesses to object to serving same-sex couples.
Wilson contends that medical conscience clauses offer a “shining lesson” of a
“live-and-let-live solution” for the conflict between religious liberty and freedom to
marry.122 Other MCP advocates agree that exemptions in the medical model would
defuse much of the controversy.123 They predict MCP would impose only a minor
burden on same-sex couples.124
***
The remainder of this Article argues that, as a theoretical matter, objections to
same-sex marriage cannot be justified by reference to conscientious objection
protections. Moreover, as a policy matter, the experience of medical conscience
legislation serves not as a shining lesson, but as a cautionary tale.
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION PROTECTION
Our legal system does not support a general proposition that “conscientious
objection” excuses one from compliance with law. Individuals (and entities) are
expected to follow the laws of the land or face the consequences. Although
legislatures and courts often accommodate religious beliefs or practices, they have

(McKinney, WestlawNext current through L.2013, chs. 1–40); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 4502(l) (Supp. 2012).
118. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4501(b) (Supp. 2012); tit. 9, § 4502(l); New Hampshire
included a similar provision. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(IV). (Supp. 2012).
119. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3-6.1(c)(2)
(West, WestlawNext current through ch. 534 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (allowing refusals related
to “the promotion of marriage through any social or religious programs or services, which
violates the religious doctrine or teachings of religious organization, association or society”).
120. CT. STAT. ANN. § 46b-35b (West Supp. 2013); see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.201(b) (West, WestlawNext current through 2013 Reg. & 1st Spec. Sess.); Act of May
14, 2013, ch. 74, § 6, 2013 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. (West).
121. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-5 (Supp. 2012).
122. See Wilson, supra note 15, at 109.
123. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 7, at 198.
124. See infra Part V.B.
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been circumspect in recognizing conscientious objection. This Part discerns why
legislative protection of conscientious objection has been limited to participation in
war, execution, and particularly controversial medical procedures. It argues that our
legal system traditionally has allowed “conscientious objection” only to life or
death acts for which one clearly can be held responsible.125
This Part identifies five principles that support legal recognition of
conscientious objection. These principles distinguish conscience exemptions that
can be justified from those that cannot, in medicine and beyond. The first three
undergird conscientious objection in the contexts of war, execution, and abortion.
As Section A sets out, across philosophical traditions, the necessity and proximity
of the objector for the alleged bad act and the severity of the consequences of the
act are central to moral responsibility. As Section B shows, two additional
principles bolster physicians’ specific claim to act on conscience—the significance
of ethical and moral reasoning to medicine and the anchoring of claims of
conscientious objection in shared professional ethics. While any one of these
principles does not suffice for legislative intervention, the first three seem most
important.
Section C argues that long-standing conscientious objection protections with
regard to medicine, the military, and execution are justified under these principles.
Traditional “conscientious objections” involve life and death; the claim is to not
harm another. The law similarly intervenes where the objector bears clear moral
responsibility for the alleged bad act in terms of both causality and proximity, not
when she is tangential or remote. In medicine, until recently, legislative protection
has focused on those objections grounded in professional ethical obligations.
This Section provides insights into why recent claims to medical conscientious
objection have been greeted by public resistance and outcry. It enables us to
distinguish between first-generation conscience legislation, which focuses on
physicians and nurses and is limited to a narrow range of procedures, and secondgeneration clauses, which broaden the actors covered (to ancillary staff like
pharmacists and paramedics) or loosen the proximity requirements (to referral or
information). This analysis indicates that the first generation of clauses accurately
reflects the theoretical foundations of medical conscience. Some recent conscience
claims in medicine and elsewhere, however, are untethered from them, raising the
specter of a nation in which each individual’s conscience is king.
Section D explains that same-sex marriage objections constitute an extreme
example of claims that lack the distinct and compelling features of conscientious
objection recognized by law. It examines several categories of objectors, ranging
from officiants to dressmakers, and marriage counselors to hospital administrators.

125. I draw a distinction here between conscientious objection and other religious
accommodations. As discussed above, the model of conscientious objections has significant
benefits for MCP proponents that disappear if instead exemption from antidiscrimination law
is at issue.
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A. Principles of Moral Responsibility: Severity of Consequences,
Necessity, and Proximity
Traditionally, conscientious objection is only recognized when the objector bears
clear causal and proximate responsibility for an act with serious consequences,
typically death. The refusals of the draftee, the executioner, and the doctor have been
to their own performance of a purported killing. Their involvement is so direct that,
on one account, the claim is to not commit a wrongful act him- or herself.126 So
understood, these actors bear little resemblance to same-sex marriage objectors, who
are not claiming a right not to be married to a person of the same sex.
Another way to understand conscientious objection, however, is as a claim not to
participate in another’s wrongdoing. Another seeks to do wrong—to fight an unjust
war, to execute a prisoner, or to undergo an abortion—and demands the objector’s
assistance. On this account, the draftee demands not to join the unjust war that is the
project of the state.127 The healthcare provider seeks to refrain from participating in
the patient’s project, whether abortion or withdrawal of life support.128 So conceived,
recognized conscientious objections move closer to same-sex marriage objections.129
Of course, one does not experience a guilty conscience because another person has
performed a wrongful act.130 Although one could feel guilt for failing to advise
against said act, it would be strange to say “my conscience prohibits you from doing
that act.”131 Instead, each individual experiences conscience in determining the
morality of his or her own actions.

126. Judith Lee Kissell, Complicity and Narrative: Insight for the Healthcare Professional,
1 MED. HEALTHCARE PHIL. 263, 264 (1998) (disputing the characterization of a doctor as
complicit given “direct control over whether or not the harm finally occurs” and because “what
the physician does suffices by itself to cause harm”).
127. Carl Cohen, Conscientious Objection, 78 ETHICS 269, 271–72 (1968) (defining
objection as refusal “to co-operate with the state . . . in its war-making activities”).
128. Armand H. Matheny Antommaria, Adjudicating Rights or Analyzing Interests:
Ethicists’ Role in the Debate over Conscience in Clinical Practice, 29 THEORETICAL MED. &
BIOETHICS 201, 202 (2008) (“[C]linicians’ primary interest is not being complicit in an action
they consider immoral . . . .”); Joseph Clint Parker, Conscience and Collective Duties: Do
Medical Professionals Have a Collective Duty to Ensure That Their Profession Provides Nondiscriminatory Access to All Medical Services?, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 28, 46 (2011) (discussing
patient as inviting doctor to participate in a collective act); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Some Things
Ought Never Be Done: Moral Absolutes in Clinical Ethics, 26 THEORETICAL MED. &
BIOETHICS 469, 481–82 (2005) (conceiving of the performance of an abortion as cooperation).
129. See Laycock, supra note 7, at 196 (describing same-sex marriage objections as related
to “the extent to which one can facilitate, condone, cooperate with, or profit from the
wrongdoing of others”).
130. James F. Childress, Appeals to Conscience, 89 ETHICS 315, 318–19 (1979).
131. Jeffrey Blustein, Doing What the Patient Orders: Maintaining Integrity in the DoctorPatient Relationship, 7 BIOETHICS 289, 299 (1993) (discussing that conscience only judges self,
not others); see COMM. ON ETHICS, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. OP.
385, THE LIMITS OF CONSCIENTIOUS REFUSAL IN REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 2 (2007) [hereinafter
ACOG],
available
at
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions
/Committee%20on%20Ethics/co385.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130928T2352471833.
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That said, people can be held responsible or blamed for their contribution to the
wrongful acts of others. The key question is thus: “When is one an accomplice in the
wrongdoing of others and when must one simply accept the fact that all of us are
morally fallible?”132 A range of philosophical traditions, associated with philosophers
from Aristotle to Bernard Williams to James Childress, have engaged with this
question.133 While these traditions are quite complex, we need not explore their
subtleties, as legislative protection of conscientious objection has only been extended
where responsibility is evident. This Section draws out factors common across
traditions.
Generally speaking, four factors determine whether cooperation with wrongdoing
is morally justified. The American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics
summarizes,
Whether assisting someone else to perform an act that you consider
immoral is wrong depends on . . . . a variety of practical considerations
including the seriousness of the wrong, the causal relationship between
the assistance and the act, the necessity of the assistance for completing
the act, and the reason for providing the assistance.134
These factors inform a variety of perspectives.135 The necessity and proximity of
one’s assistance to the wrongful act and the seriousness of that act are balanced
against one’s role and the gravity of one’s reason for cooperation.136 Under this

132. Daniel P. Sulmasy, What Is Conscience and Why Is Respect for It So Important?, 29
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 135, 141 (2008).
133. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Societal Duty and Moral Complicity: The Physician’s
Dilemma of Divided Loyalty, 16 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 371, 371 (1993); see also
Antommaria, supra note 128, at 206 (“Roman Catholic moral tradition provides the most
extensive analysis of the concept of cooperation.”); Noam J. Zohar, Co-operation Despite
Disagreement: From Politics to Healthcare, 17 BIOETHICS 121, 122 (2003) (discussing Jewish
tradition of ascribing responsibility).
134. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Bioethics, Policy Statement—Physician Refusal to
Provide Information or Treatment on the Basis of Claims of Conscience, 124 PEDIATRICS 1689,
1690 (2009). Although many analyses begin with the question of whether the person shares the
wrongdoer’s intent and joins fully in his wrongdoing, for objectors across contexts shared
intent is not at issue. See Kevin Wm. Wildes, Conscience, Referral, and Physician Assisted
Suicide, 18 J. MED. & PHIL. 323, 325–26 (1993).
135. See, e.g., RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, BUSINESS ETHICS 87–106 (3d ed. 1990) (evaluating
moral responsibility contextually in relation to agent’s action, knowledge, or freedom); Thomas
M. Jones, Ethical Decision Making by Individuals in Organizations: An Issue-Contingent
Model, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 366, 374–78, 380, 390–91 (1991) (developing theory that allots
responsibility according to the severity of the act’s consequences, the certainty the act is moral
or immoral, degree of complicity in the act, and extent of pressure); Kissell, supra note 126, at
264 (drawing on casuistic traditions of the common law to understand accountability for
someone else’s acts); Sulmasy, supra note 132, at 141–42 (reviewing factors from Catholic
moral philosophy used to determine whether one is an accomplice in wrongdoing).
136. James Keenan & Thomas Kopfensteiner, The Principle of Cooperation, HEALTH
PROGRESS, Apr. 1995, at 23; William Newton, Avoiding Cooperation with Evil: Keeping Your
Nose Clean in a Dirty World, HOMELITIC & PASTORAL REV. (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.hprweb.com/2012/09/avoiding-cooperation-with-evil-keeping-your-nose-clean-in-
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analysis, people properly may “act for their own legitimate ends, foreseeing but not
intending that their action will facilitate that wrongdoing.”137
Our moral intuitions support this construct. The psychological literature confirms
that we are most likely to assign responsibility to those who are closely connected to
and the proximate cause of an act with serious consequences.138 Moreover, people
tend to attribute greater responsibility to cooperation that risks death than they do to
injury or job termination.139
The first two factors—necessity and proximity—relate to two dimensions of
causality, akin to causation in fact and proximate cause. As to necessity, the question
is, how necessary is one’s participation to the wrongdoer’s act?140 As Daniel Sulmasy
says, “The more likely that it could occur without one’s cooperation, the more
justified is one’s cooperation.”141 As to proximity, theories of moral responsibility
recognize that involvement runs on a “continuum from ‘innocent bystander’ to sole
cause of the event.”142 Even if one’s act of cooperation could be said to be one in a
chain of events, it may not be adequately proximate so as to render cooperation
outside the pale.143 Where the cooperator falls on the causal chain in terms of time,
space, and intervening events or actors influences the analysis.144 Sulmasy again
adds, “The further removed one is, the more justified is one’s cooperation.”145
a-dirty-world/ (balancing “the proportion between the goodness and obligatory character of the
goal he is pursuing, and the gravity of the evil he is facilitating”).
137. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Catholics as Citizens, AMERICA, Nov. 1, 2010, at 12, 13–14.
138. See generally F. Fincham & J. Jaspars, Attribution of Responsibility to the Self and
Others in Children and Adults, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1589 (1979); Lee
Hamilton, Chains of Command: Responsibility Attribution in Hierarchies, 16 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCH. 118 (1986) (finding that attributions were highest for those who had role responsibility
and causal responsibility for deaths).
139. Thomas M. Jones & Lori Verstegen Ryan, The Link Between Ethical Judgment and
Action in Organization: A Moral Approbation Approach, 8 ORG. SCI. 663, 671 (1997).
140. Pellegrino, supra note 133, at 377–78 (a key consideration is “the extent to which the
participant’s actions are necessary to, and/or causal of, the harm”).
141. Sulmasy, supra note 132, at 141.
142. Jones & Ryan, supra note 139, at 672.
143. Newton, supra note 136 (“Proximity can make a difference because, the closer the
action of the cooperator is to the action of the evil-doer, the more the cooperator shares in the
action of the evil-doer.”); Pellegrino, supra note 133, at 378 (noting that cooperation can be
justified when “the participant’s actions are not necessary or causal but only remotely
facilitative”).
144. See Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They
Be Accommodated?, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 47, 61 (2010) (focusing on proximity to
objectionable act and personal contact and observing “value in the law denying that every
remote connection really amounts to significant participation”); P. Nortvedt & M. Nordhaug,
The Principle and Problem of Proximity in Ethics, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 156, 157 (2008)
(discussing proximity in spatial, temporal, and relational terms); Dennis M. Sullivan & Aaron
Costerisan, Complicity and Stem Cell Research: Countering the Utilitarian Argument, 24
ETHICS & MED. 151, 154 (2008) (“[T]he passage of time reduces complicity to a morally
repugnant act.”); Robert D. Orr, Addressing Issues of Moral Complicity: When? Where? Why?
and Other Questions, CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & HUM. DIGNITY (May 22, 2003), http://
cbhd.org/content/addressing-issues-moral-complicity-when-where-why-and-other-questions
(arguing for importance of timing, proximity, and remoteness to material cooperation analysis).
145. Sulmasy, supra note 132, at 141.
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Even if one’s act meets the factors of necessity and proximity, various traditions
agree that these factors must be balanced against the seriousness of the
consequences of the wrongdoer’s act. Summarizing the views of many
philosophers, Velasquez observes that the seriousness of the wrong is the key
consideration to be weighed against one’s level of involvement and the gravity of
one’s reason for acting.146 Moral responsibility “will clearly vary according to the
severity of consequences of the act in question.”147 Note that the seriousness of
consequences is not self-regarding. Whether objector feels injured himself is
immaterial; the focus is on harm to other people.
Proportionality analysis reflects that a person’s responsibility can be reduced by
the importance of her reason for cooperation. The less serious the harm caused by
the wrongdoer’s act, the less weighty must the reason for cooperation be.148
Maintaining good relations with others in one’s profession may provide adequate
reason.149 Other mitigating factors or excuses, such as duress or legal compliance,
also may relieve one of responsibility.150
B. Theoretical Principles Specific to Medicine
Whereas necessity, proximity, and grave harm ground conscientious objection
across contexts, medical conscientious objection rests on two additional
principles—namely, the centrality of moral reasoning to medicine and the
grounding of objections in professional ethics. These principles bolster physicians’
specific claim to act on conscience and further limit conscience protection in the
medical context.
1. Medicine as a Conscientious Profession
A number of scholars identify “professional conscience” informed by moral
precepts internal to medicine as essential to medical practice.151 To navigate

146. MANUEL G. VELASQUEZ, BUSINESS ETHICS: CONCEPTS AND CASES 120–42 (7th ed.
2011) (summarizing views of many moral philosophers).
147. Jones & Ryan, supra note 139, at 671.
148. Sulmasy, supra note 132, at 141.
149. Joseph Boyle, Radical Moral Disagreement in Contemporary Health Care: A
Roman Catholic Perspective, 19 J. MED. & PHIL. 183, 198 (1994).
150. Antommaria, supra note 128, at 206 (discussing importance of legal requirements to
analysis); Sulmasy, supra note 132, at 141 (discussing duress).
151. William P. Cheshire, Jr., When Conscience Meddles with Ethics, 27 ETHICS & MED.
139, 139 (2011) (“Conscience is at the heart of the medical profession’s commitment to
honesty, compassion, and taking responsibility to prevent harm.”); Alan Cribb, Integrity at
Work: Managing Routine Moral Stress in Professional Roles, 12 NURSING PHIL. 119, 122
(2011) (“[T]he ethical identity of a practitioner is partly constituted by their membership of a
professional community . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); David C. Thomasma, Beyond Medical
Paternalism and Patient Autonomy: A Model of Physician Conscience for the Physician–
Patient Relationship, 98 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 243, 246 (1983) (arguing in favor of
professional conscience rooted in beneficence and the condition of the patient); see also TOM
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 33 (7th ed. 2013)
(arguing conscientiousness “support[s] and promote[s] caring”); James Appleyard, Who
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ethically complex medical questions, physicians need ethical virtues as much as
they need clinical skills.152 Through training and socialization, professional ideals
become integrated with personal ideals, religious and otherwise, that physicians
and nurses bring to bear when they encounter patients.153
Across diverse bioethical perspectives, the importance of conscience derives
from characteristics unique to medicine, including the intimacy of healthcare
relationships, the shared role in decision making, and, most fundamentally, the
complexity of moral issues—all of which differentiate medicine from most other
occupations. Both law and societal expectations treat the practice of medicine as
not only “a distribution of a commodity” but also “a social good . . . that is
uniquely defined according to moral relationships.”154 In contrast to commercial
transactions, relationships in healthcare are intimate and cannot be armslength.155
Doctors consequently have duties to keep self-interest second to the patient’s
interests. As Franklin Miller and Howard Brody say, “medical ethics can never be
reduced to the ethics of marketplace encounters.”156
The role of physician requires assuming some responsibility for healthcare
decisions. Studies increasingly find that neither paternalism nor pure patient
autonomy represents an accurate (or desirable) view of modern medical practice.157
Decisions about care, instead, are often shared.158 A patient, for better or worse,
Cares? The Declaration of Helsinki and ‘The Conscience of Physicians,’ 4 RES. ETHICS REV.
106, 107 (2008); Peter Bartmann, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: German
Protestantism, Conscience, and the Limits of Purely Ethical Reflection, 9 CHRISTIAN
BIOETHICS 203, 216 (2003) (“Physicians have a traditional ethos of conscience . . . .”
(emphasis in original)); Parker, supra note 128, at 39 (“[I]t is the physician’s moral stance
toward his patients that protects and benefits the patient.”).
152. Piers Benn, Conscience and Health Care Ethics, in PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE
ETHICS 345, 345 (R.E. Ashcroft et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007); see also Laurence B. McCullough,
The Nature and Limits of the Physician’s Professional Responsibilities, 29 J. MED. & PHIL.
3, 4 (2004) (describing importance of intellectual and moral integrity in medicine).
153. Edward M. Spencer, Physician’s Conscience and HECs: Friends or Foes?, 10 HEC
F. 34, 36, 38 (1998); see Vera Dahlqvist, Sture Eriksson, Ann-Louise Glasberg, Elisabeth
Lindahl, Kim Lützén, Gunilla Strandberg, Anna Söderberg, Venke Sørlie & Astrid Norberg,
Development of the Perceptions of Conscience Questionnaire, 14 NURSING ETHICS 181, 189
(2007) (physicians reporting consulting conscience in situations of uncertainty).
154. Matthew K. Wynia, Stephen R. Latham, Audiey C. Kao, Jessica W. Berg & Linda
L. Emanuel, Medical Professionalism in Society, 341 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1612, 1612
(1999).
155. Jacob M. Appel, May Doctors Refuse Infertility Treatments to Gay Patients?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 2006, at 20, 21 (“The nature of the doctor-patient
relationship is fundamentally more intimate than the sorts of interactions that occur between
landlords and tenants or innkeepers and guests.”); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust,
55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 471 (2002) (arguing the doctor-patient relationship has a “deeply
personal type of trust . . . paralleled only in fraternal, family, or love relationships”).
156. Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, Enhancement Technologies and Professional
Integrity, AM. J. BIOETHICS, May–June 2005, at 15, 16; see also Benn, supra note 152, at 345
(distinguishing doctor-patient relationship from business-consumer relationship).
157. Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics with a Human Face, 69 IND. L.J. 1075 (1994) (arguing
that the autonomy paradigm is too simplistic an approach).
158. Alexander A. Kon, Commentary, The Shared Decision-Making Continuum, 304
JAMA 903, 903 (2010).
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cannot choose a particular medical procedure independent of the judgment of a
professional.159 At minimum, a doctor acts as a “counselor and guide.”160
The moral complexity of medicine demands of medical providers the ability to
exercise ethical judgment with sensitivity. Medical decisions often take place under
conditions of considerable moral uncertainty and high stakes unseen in commercial
and employment relations. Many involve multiple options with no single correct
choice.161 “Quality of life,” for example, requires a judgment that may vary
according to how each person defines a good, or sufficient, life. Indeed, moral
dilemmas so inhere to healthcare that the nursing literature has developed the term
“moral distress” to refer to providers feeling torn between their duties and the
perceived right action.162
One might challenge the characterization of medicine as a conscientious
profession with superior entitlements to protection. Alta Charo, for example, rejects
the view that the role of judgment can explain “why the physician ought to have
more authority over patient choices than a candy seller has over consumer
purchases.”163 She argues that, while doctors may refuse to perform procedures,
they should only do so based on medical inappropriateness, not moral
approbation.164 By contrast, she says, conscientious objection flies in the face of
“the prevailing medical ethic . . . of universal care” and may ultimately be
explained by discrimination.165 As Charo notes, although a physician is expected to
treat a criminal, one does not hear arguments that, by doing so, he or she becomes
complicit in the criminal’s immoral acts.166 On this account, physician value
neutrality should be the goal.
This point is well taken and may accurately describe some objections. Two
arguments, nonetheless, indicate that, on balance, medical providers have a
compelling—which is not to say absolute—claim to act in accordance with

159. See Bartmann, supra note 151, at 217 (“A restricted version of the principle of
patient autonomy could be put like this: The patient has only a veto against any offered
medical treatment.” (emphasis in original)); Blustein, supra note 131, at 289 (predicting
legitimate moral conflict between physicians and patients unless physicians become required
to accommodate all patient requests); Cheshire, supra note 151, at 139 (noting that a patient
has an unqualified right to refuse treatment, but can only demand treatment subject to
physician discretion).
160. Miller & Brody, supra note 156, at 16; see also Bartmann, supra note 151, at 216
(noting that although “it is widely accepted in protestant thought that professional life . . . is
the place where ethical responsibility is practiced[,]. . . . decision making professionals like
physicians” have a superior claim (emphasis in original)); Lindsay, supra note 113, at 26
(concluding this factor separates physicians from other occupations).
161. Jared R. Adams, Glyn Elwyn & France Légaré, Communicating with Physicians
About Medical Decisions: A Reluctance to Disagree, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MEDICINE
1184, 1184–85.
162. Ellen H. Elpern, Barbara Covert & Ruth Kleinpell, Moral Distress of Staff Nurses in
a Medical Intensive Care Unit, 14 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 523, 523 (2005).
163. R. Alta Charo, Health Care Provider Refusals to Treat, Prescribe, Refer or Inform:
Professionalism and Conscience, ADVANCE, Spring 2007, at 119, 127–28.
164. Id. at 128.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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conscience. First, one could contend that “medicine cannot be morally neutral.”167
Despite the tendency to compartmentalize scientific decisions and moral decisions
in medicine, the distinction frequently falls apart on closer examination. Even
questions about the value of new procedures “can be matters of conscience for the
physician who wants to be a ‘good’ clinician, surgeon, healer, or counselor.”168
Dr. Kyle Brothers gives the example of the seemingly straightforward clinical
decision to refuse antibiotics to patients with upper respiratory infections; he points
out that even such decisions place moral values on possible harms, such as the
spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, and possible benefits to patients and the
public.169 Scientific decisions may not be value neutral. While doctors should never
impose their own beliefs on patients, a doctor will be called upon to exercise some
judgment as long as a pure autonomy model does not accurately reflect the reality
of doctor-patient interaction.
Second, removing conscience from the medical enterprise could negatively
affect patients. Nurses, for example, report that acting conscientiously creates
positive effects, increasing their sensitivity to patient needs and encouraging them
to perform morally courageous acts.170 As the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists explains, “conscience, so conceived, . . . has a critical and useful
place in the practice of medicine. In many cases, it can foster thoughtful, effective,
and humane care.”171 Although one may be skeptical of the benefits of professional
conscience to patient care, to the extent it fosters awareness of ethical issues it has
value.172 As Beauchamp and Childress note, “detached fairness,” which is “suitable
for some moral relationships, especially those in which persons interact as equals in
a public context of impersonal justice and institutional constraints” might lead to a
lack of caring or “uncaring indifference” unsuited to healthcare relationships.173

167. Cheshire, supra note 151, at 139.
168. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician’s Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and
Religious Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 230 (2002).
169. Kyle B. Brothers, Dependent Rational Providers, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 133, 139
(2011) (“We should not assume that just because a decision is routine, like the decision not
to prescribe antibiotics, it is not deeply moral.”).
170. Annika Jensen & Evy Lidell, The Influence of Conscience in Nursing, 16 NURSING
ETHICS 31, 35–37 (2009).
171. ACOG, supra note 131, at 2.
172. See generally Douglas B. White & Baruch Brody, Commentary, Would
Accommodating Some Conscientious Objections by Physicians Promote Quality in Medical
Care?, 305 JAMA 1804 (2011) (arguing that the debate over conscience should take account
of several benefits of allowing providers to act on conscience).
173. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 36; see also Parker, supra note 128, at
38–39 (making similar point); Thomasma, supra note 151, at 246 (arguing that conscience
resolves ethical quandaries by preserving as many values as possible); Laurie ZolothDorfman & Susan B. Rubin, Insider Trading: Conscience and Critique in Bioethics, 10 HEC
F. 24, 29 (1998) (discussing “dangers of complacency” and importance of conscientious
objection to prevent excesses in managed care).
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2. Anchoring in Professional Ethics
In addition to the importance of conscience, the principle that objections remain
within the bounds of shared professional ethics further distinguishes medicine. As
leading bioethical accounts agree, physicians’ conscientious judgments must be
rooted in shared professional norms, if they are to be respected.174 Such norms
include:
1) the prevention of disease and injury and promotion and maintenance
of health; 2) the relief of pain and suffering caused by maladies; 3) the
care and cure of those with a malady, and the care of those who cannot
be cured; and 4) the avoidance of premature death and the pursuit of a
peaceful death.175
Intertwined with requirements that objections have a basis in professional ethics is
the importance of the strength of scientific evidence supporting objections.176
With this limiting principle, conflicts manifest themselves between a patient’s
values and the values of the profession as a whole, rather than one doctor’s
values.177 In such cases, the profession has determined that the objected practice is
ethically (and legally) acceptable for doctors to perform. Simultaneously, the
professional community has allowed conscientious objection, subject to the ethical
compromise that physicians inform patients of treatment options, refer for
treatments they do not provide,178 and do not abandon a patient already under their

174. See, e.g., HOLLY FERNANDEZ LYNCH, CONFLICTS OF CONSCIENCE IN HEALTH CARE 34
(2008) (limiting objection to “refusals grounded in values that are widely held within the
profession and have even been accepted as clinical standards”); Blustein, supra note 131, at
312 (arguing whether refusal is permissible depends on “ethical consensus within the
profession”); McCullough, supra note 152, at 6 (“Professional conscience concerns
boundaries of behavior that no physician should cross, because to do so would be
inconsistent with and undermine intellectual and moral integrity . . . .”); Carolyn McLeod,
Referral in the Wake of Conscientious Objection to Abortion, 23 HYPATIA, 30, 38 (2008)
(“[P]hysicians cannot make conscientious objections in their practices that violate
established norms of the profession that are morally justified”); Mark R. Wicclair,
Conscientious Objection in Medicine, 14 BIOETHICS 205, 217 (2000) (“[A]n appeal to
conscience has significant moral weight only if the core ethical values on which it is based
correspond to one or more core values in medicine.”).
175. Miller & Brody, supra note 156, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. ACOG, supra note 131, at 3–4; Mark R. Wicclair, Reasons and Healthcare
Professionals’ Claims of Conscience, AM. J. BIOETHICS, June 2007, at 21, 22 (“[I]t is
warranted to reject claims of conscience if they are based on demonstrably false beliefs.”).
177. Angelo E. Volandes & Elmer D. Abbo, Toward a Reconstruction of a Professional
Medical Morality, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 88, 89.
178. Sylvia A. Law, Silent No More: Physicians’ Legal and Ethical Obligations to
Patients Seeking Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 279, 303–06 (1994); Ryan E.
Lawrence & Farr A. Curlin, Physicians’ Beliefs About Conscience in Medicine: A National
Survey, 84 ACAD. MED. 1276, 1278 (2009) (documenting strong professional ethic of referral
for services one believes morally wrong).
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care.179 Carolyn McLeod summarizes the benefits of conscientious objection under
these conditions:
First, it helps preserve the integrity of the profession. Second, it helps
maintain patient trust, since . . . confusion about what norms someone
will follow can seriously inhibit trust . . . . Third, . . . [p]hysicians have
agreed to follow the norms of their profession, if only by accepting the
privileges that go along with membership in the profession.180
Rooted in professional ethics, claims of conscientious objection, at least until
recently, have not been anarchic.
Although traditional objections sound in the language of professional ethics,
they also undeniably arise most frequently with regard to birth and death, those
areas most intertwined with religious values.181 The community of coreligionists,
however, does not suffice to determine the morality of a physician’s actions. Given
shared ethics, each physician must seek to maintain professional integrity, not only
personal beliefs.182 One’s fellow physicians serve as a—or perhaps the—referent
moral community.183
Admittedly, professional norms have often protected the interests of the
profession, instead of the public.184 Nonetheless, today our social expectations of
medical professionals drive compliance with and development of the norms of the
profession.185 The public demands that physicians care for patients and justify their
decisions within these ethical boundaries.186
C. Justifying Legal Protection of Conscientious Objection
With the principles justifying protection of conscientious objection in mind, this
Section evaluates conscience claims in medicine and beyond. It relies on bounded,
neutral principles, not the subjective experience of each objector. These principles
of necessity, proximity, and gravity of harm prevent opening the door to anarchy.
When, instead, conscience claims become untethered from these recognized

179. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 121 (2012).
180. McLeod, supra note 174, at 37.
181. Joel Frader & Charles L. Bosk, The Personal Is Political, the Professional Is Not:
Conscientious Objection to Obtaining/Providing/Acting on Genetic Information, 151C AM.
J. MED. GENETICS 62, 63 (2009).
182. McCullough, supra note 152, at 8 (“[M]anaging troubled professional or individual
conscience is a day-in, day-out challenge in clinical ethics and such management often
cannot avoid a residue or remainder of regret.”).
183. See Jones & Ryan, supra note 139, at 663 (discussing the importance of a referent
community for moral responsibility).
184. Robert M. Veatch, Assessing Pellegrino’s Reconstruction of Medical Morality, AM.
J. BIOETHICS, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 72, 73 (arguing that professional codes cannot serve to
protect patients or maintain their trust, because they are developed without public
involvement).
185. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 151, at 33.
186. See id.
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foundations as has occurred in recent expansions of medical conscience legislation,
they risk destabilizing our legal and medical systems.
Longstanding conscience protections clearly accord with the elements of moral
responsibility. The draft, execution, abortion, and end-of-life procedures are linked
to serious consequences. In each area, the traditional objector’s act—firing a
weapon, injecting poison, or performing a procedure—has been both proximate and
necessary. In the medical context, legislators have, at least until recently, reserved
protections for those objections anchored in the ethical obligations of the profession
as a whole. Indeed, the involvement is so direct and the harm so grievous in the
objector’s view that these contexts together might be viewed as sui generis.187
First, in these areas, conscientious objection operates by reference to an act of
killing. In the context of the draft, claims of conscientious objection originated in a
religious “belief that the taking of human life under any circumstance is evil.”188
Even as it expanded to include objection to particular wars, conscientious objection
to military service remained linked to the “performance of actions contrary to
deeply held moral convictions about indiscriminate killing.”189 Refusal to
participate in the imposition of the death penalty similarly relates to the gravity of
harm to another. Medical practice also is set apart from other commercial and
professional pursuits by its life-or-death nature.
First-generation medical conscience legislation has largely mirrored
conscientious objection to participation in war or imposition of the death penalty.
Legislatures have not intervened in every potential conflict of conscience, but
rather target those circumstances in which medical providers might otherwise be
called upon to perform an act that results in death or ends the potential for life.190
For a small subset of physicians, for instance, removal of life support represents
impermissible harm to a patient to whom one bears specific obligations and is, in
effect, a killing.191 Some others understand abortion to involve harm to another, in
effect a killing or taking of potential life. Although people disagree over the moral

187. See, e.g., Zohar, supra note 133, at 133 (arguing objection to abortion as direct
murder cannot serve as “a model for ‘similar’ cases, but rather a limiting case”).
188. Charles C. Moskos & John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Secularization of
Conscience, in THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 3, 9 (Charles C. Moskos & John
Whiteclay Chambers II eds., 1993).
189. Jeremy Kessler, Conscience, Coercion, and Equality in Catholic American Legal
Thought 1962–1975, at 33 (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal)
(quoting Nat’l Conference of Catholic Bishops, Human Life in Our Day (Nov. 15, 1968), in
III PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS 164, ¶ 152 (Hugh J. Nolan
ed., 1983)).
190. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 291–92.
191. See Farr A. Curlin, Chinyere Nwodim, Jennifer L. Vance, Marshall H. Chin & John
D. Lantos, To Die, to Sleep: US Physicians’ Religious and Other Objections to PhysicianAssisted Suicide, Terminal Sedation, and Withdrawal of Life Support, 25 AM. J. HOSPICE &
PALLIATIVE MED. 112, 116–17 (2008) (reporting survey finding that five percent of
physicians object to withdrawal of artificial life support (WLS) and opining “[t]hat Catholic
physicians are more likely to object to WLS than Protestants may reflect Catholic doctrines
prohibiting actions intended to shorten life”).
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status of abortion and whether it involves a killing, as Ronald Dworkin long argued
neither side can treat the other as illegitimate beyond the pale.192
Debates over the first medical conscience clause—the Church Amendment—
explicitly linked the draft and abortion in terms both of direct involvement and
killing. Representative Margaret Heckler, for example, argued that “[c]onscientious
objection to the taking of unborn life deserves as much consideration and respect as
does conscientious objection to warfare.”193 Throughout the 1970s, Catholic
conscientious objection to war and to abortion intersected.194 As discussion of
abortion unfolded in the shadow of the Vietnam War, John Noonan, the leading
Catholic thinker of the day, opined that “Christian opposition to genocide, to urban
air raids, to the Vietnam War was no more and no less theological than the
Christian opposition to abortion.”195
Today, legislative protection of refusals to perform abortions and end-of-life
procedures are understood to share these characteristics.196 As Ira Lupu and Robert
Tuttle observe, “Exemptions from mandatory provision of abortion services, like
exemptions from conscription in times of war, focus specifically on those who
might be forced to terminate human life.”197 Indeed, advocates of broader
protections have been most successful in expanding conscience protection when
they employ arguments around taking of a life or potential life.198 The severity of
consequences of the objectionable act has been preeminent.
Second, even when the harm is severe, the law typically intercedes only if the
objector is necessary to the alleged wrongful act. The soldier must pull the trigger,
the executioner must flip the switch, and the doctor must perform the procedure. As
a matter of moral responsibility, each functions as a primary cause of the ultimate
act; it could not occur, or would occur only with great difficulty, without his
involvement. Their roles are not innocent bystanders outside of the causal chain.
Third, the proximity of one’s involvement has been central to legislative
protection of conscience. From the time of the Civil War, draftees could assert
objections to “the bearing of arms” to be assigned noncombatant duties or to pay a

192.
193.
194.
195.

RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 68–71 (1993).
Kessler, supra note 189, at 54 (quoting AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 12, 1973, at 15).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 54 n.235 (quoting JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN
AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 53–54 (1979)).
196. See, e.g., Maureen Kramlich, The Abortion Debate Thirty Years Later: From Choice
to Coercion, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 783, 801 (2004) (arguing that protecting against “forced
involvement in abortion” is consistent with excusing participation in wartime killing);
Christopher Meyers & Robert D. Woods, An Obligation to Provide Abortion Services: What
Happens When Physicians Refuse?, 22 J. MED. ETHICS 115, 120 n.22 (1996) (arguing both
involve “life or death consequences”); Mark L. Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not to Kill,
62 EMORY L.J. 121, 147 (2012) (linking draft, execution, and assisted suicide, noting that
whether abortion is killing is contested); Huseina Sulaimanee, Protecting the Right to
Choose: Regulating Conscience Clauses in the Face of Moral Obligation, 17 CARDOZO J.L.
& GENDER 417, 435 (2011) (observing the argument about killing “parallels conscientious
objection to war”).
197. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 291.
198. Id. at 291–92.
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fine.199 Federal law excuses objections to participating in an execution or
prosecuting a capital offence, rather than far-reaching objections.200
First-generation medical conscience legislation, relating to assisted suicide,
withholding of life support, and abortion, similarly reflects this principle. Objectors
are shielded to the extent they directly perform or participate in the performance of
the alleged bad act. Legislation typically extends to physicians and nurses
“performing,” “providing,” or “participating in” controversial procedures.201 This
recognizes the close presence of nurses and doctors to the patient and procedure. A
nurse assisting a doctor in an abortion may not directly perform the procedure, but
is exceptionally close and necessary to the act itself.202 Both the act in question and
the degree of the individual’s involvement influence the success of the claim.203
Finally, much of the debate over conscience in medicine focuses on objections
plausibly rooted in the goals of medicine. Take, for example, objections
surrounding end-of-life treatment. Futile treatment often gives rise to objections,
with 17.9% of family medicine physicians in one study refusing to provide futile
care on moral grounds.204 They assert a duty not to “promote the suffering of
patients by the use of aggressive life-prolonging treatments.”205 Similarly, for some

199. LEON WHIPPLE, THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 162 (1927).
The administrative burdens on the military caused by objectors who objected to any
participation in the military during wartime subsequently prompted additional exemptions
for members of peace churches who would be assigned to alternate civilian service. Tara
J. Carnahan, The Quakers and Conscientious Objection, 20 HISTORIA 1, 7–9 (2011) (student
paper). Arguably, these exceptions go beyond direct involvement in killing. Nonetheless, the
particular quality of wartime drafted service into the military may set these apart. The
involuntary nature of association, uniformed service, one’s status as a combatant under
international humanitarian law, and one’s service directly to the “war machine” suggest the
draft presents circumstances different even than execution.
200. 18 U.S.C. § 3597(b) (2012).
201. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-13 (2011) (“perform” or “assist in the
performance”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2F-7 (LexisNexis 2011) (same); see also Lynn
D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED.
177, 187 (1993) (“Many conscience clauses limit protection to persons engaged in directly
providing medical treatment or medical services—the ones in the operating room, at the
place of delivery of the controversial medical service itself.”).
202. Bartmann, supra note 151, at 216 (arguing nurses have the authority of close
presence to the patient).
203. See Noam Zohar, Moral Disagreement and Providing Emergency Contraception,
AM. J. BIOETHICS, June 2007, at 35, 36 (2007); see also Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the
Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal Clauses for Pharmacists,
48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 523 (2006) (arguing that extension of pharmacist conscience
legislation has been controversial because the “pharmacist is not directly administering a
drug or performing a procedure” and lacks “significant patient contact”).
204. Jennifer E. Frank, Conscientious Refusal in Family Medicine Residency Training,
43 FAM. MED. 330, 332 (2011); see also Ryan Blum, Conscience Rules: Implications for
Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2011, at 49, 49 (“In a few cases providers feel so
strongly about refusing to perform an intervention (for example, aggressive cardiopulmonary
resuscitation of a patient dying from refractory leukemia) that they seek to invoke a right of
professional conscience . . . .”).
205. Volandes & Abbo, supra note 177, at 89.
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medical providers, abortion constitutes a grievous harm in that it countermands the
duty to do no harm.206 The anti-abortion stance thus “bears sufficient affinity to
certain generally accepted core values of medicine,” whereas, for example, the
withholding of pain relief during labor because the book of Genesis establishes the
pain of childbirth as Eve’s punishment does not.207
The defenders of MCP claim objections to same-sex marriage fall within the
legal tradition of conscientious objection. But the law does not tolerate every
idiosyncratic objection. It rightly restricts conscientious objection protection to the
draft, death penalty, abortion, and closely related contexts. Granting legal
protection in this limited way reflects the reality that all people contribute to
projects of others that they otherwise oppose. We pay taxes for programs we do not
support. We compensate people who may use the funds to buy illegal products or
donate to reprehensible causes.
By limiting the use of conscientious objection based on its distinct and
compelling features, our legal system discourages moral rigidity, ensures
government functioning, and prevents each person from becoming a law unto
herself. So doing, we recognize that conscience claims far afield from recognized
moral and ethical foundations may undermine our legal and medical systems to the
detriment of all.
With the limitations of life and death, proximity, and necessity, our legal system
rejects moral rigidity from its citizens. It recognizes that a too rigid position on
cooperation with immoral activity can only be satisfied by withdrawing from public
life, denying moral value to engagement in the world.208 By contrast, as Judith
Kissell argues, drawing lines based on a person’s proximity and necessity to
wrongdoing “prevent[s] her from spending her time and resources interminably
protesting wrongdoing in society.”209 They keep her from “abandoning institutions,
all of which sooner or later violate her principles.”210
The treatment of conscientious objection in lawsuits and legislation reflects this
concern. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously declined to grant a
religious exemption from a required course “in military science and tactics” to
students at the University of California because of its indirect role in military
efforts.211 As Justice Cardozo stated in his concurrence, “Never in our history has
the notion been accepted, or even, it is believed, advanced, that acts thus indirectly
related to service in the camp or field are so tied to the practice of religion as to be
exempt, in law or in morals, from regulation by the state.”212 Objectors to the draft
must perform alternate service to the state, and often the military, even though they
thereby indirectly contribute to the state’s efforts.213 In peacetime, citizens who

206. See Zohar, supra note 133, at 129 (noting that cases where compromise would not
be possible do not frequently arise with regard to other medical procedures).
207. Benn, supra note 152, at 349.
208. Ron Hamel, Cooperation: A Principle that Reflects Reality, HEALTH PROGRESS,
Sept–Oct. 2012, at 80, 81.
209. Kissell, supra note 126, at 266 (footnote omitted).
210. Id.
211. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
212. Id. at 267 (Cardozo, J. concurring).
213. Joseph B. Mackey, Reclaiming the In-Service Conscientious Objection Program:
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disagree with state killing through the death penalty or police use of deadly force
must continue, through taxes for example, to “support actions of the state’s agents
through which innocents are left to die or are directly killed.”214 Similarly, although
it is within the causal chain and may in fact be necessary to the patient securing the
procedure, referral for a procedure has not usually been considered adequately
proximate to the act to justify conscientious objector protection. Legislatures have
not considered translating for patients or transporting them to be so direct as to
allow participants to “conscientiously object” to performing their jobs.215 The law
reasonably discourages the scrupulosity of the eggshell conscientious objector.
From a pragmatic perspective, restricting conscientious objection protection also
ensures the efficacy of government. For example, when confronting taxpayers’
conscientious objection to participating in the Vietnam War through financing, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that “the ability of the government to function could be
impaired or even destroyed” by such claims.216 The importance of ensuring the
exemptions do not swallow the rule similarly influenced the Supreme Court’s
rejection of an employer’s challenge to participation in the social security system.
The Court noted that “[t]o maintain an organized society that guarantees religious
freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to
the common good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated, but there is a point at
which accommodation would ‘radically restrict the operating latitude of the
legislature.’”217 The religious and moral pluralism of the United States invites any
number of potential objections. In the words of the Ninth Circuit, “There are few, if
any, governmental activities to which some person or group might not object on
religious grounds.”218 By contrast, the focus of longstanding conscientious
objection protections on killing suggests that such legislation “reflects the specific
moral character of the act, rather than a more general deference to the subjective
demands of conscience.”219
This analysis suggests that more expansive medical conscience legislation
cannot be justified as analogous to objection to war or abortion. It does not share
the key characteristics of traditional conscience protections. Some legislation now
concerns procedures far removed from death or permanent injury, like assisted
reproduction.220 A few encompass individuals distant in time, locale, and
association from the alleged bad act, such as a surgical aide instructed to clean
Proposals for Creating a Meaningful Limitation to the Claim of Conscientious Objection,
ARMY LAW., Aug. 2008, at 31, 46 (discussing alternative service program for conscientious
objectors that requires “appropriate civilian work contributing to the national health, safety,
or interest”).
214. Zohar, supra note 133, at 127.
215. Adamson v. Superior Ambulance Serv., No. 1:04-CV-3247 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2004);
see also Steven Kreytak, Bus Driver Says Religious Views Led to Firing: Man Refused to
Take Clients to Planned Parenthood Clinic, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN (Jul. 16, 2010,
8:49 PM),
http://www.statesman.com/news/local/bus-driver-says-religious-views-led-tofiring-807732.html.
216. Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 588–89 (9th Cir. 1969).
217. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) (citations omitted) (quoting
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
218. Autenrieth, 418 F.2d at 589.
219. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 292.
220. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (LexisNexis 2009).
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instruments used in abortions.221 Such individuals do not play the role of counselor
and only become involved after the patient and physician have made a decision.
Others, such as pharmacists, are not privy to relevant information. Their
involvement is often mediate and remote, rather than immediate and proximate.222
As bioethicist Ronald Lindsay notes, “The notion that such healthcare workers are
responsible for the healthcare decisions of others is untenable . . . .”223 Finally,
three states broadly allow medical providers to decline to participate in, refer for, or
give information about any healthcare service—a far cry from what professional
ethics support.224
Ultimately, conscience claims unjustified by accepted and limited moral
foundations invite “conscience creep” in which all resistance to regulation becomes
acceptable.225 They allow anarchy, where any individual can win exemption free of
the weighty bases demanded for military, death penalty, and medical objections. In
the words of the Supreme Court, they “would . . . make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect . . . permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself.”226 Such unjustified claims devalue the meaning of
conscientious objection itself. They seek to overturn a system that acknowledges
that although the law—like conscience—can be wrong, each citizen is obliged to
obey it so long as “one sincerely and conscientiously thinks that his society, on
balance, is a just one.”227
The principles here explain why proponents of conscience legislation have been
less successful with this more expansive legislation than they have with abortion
and end-of-life treatments. These principles allow us to more rigorously scrutinize
future claims of conscience in medicine and, now, in response to same-sex
marriage.

221. Tramm v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., No. H 87-355, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391 (N.D.
Ind. Dec. 21, 1989) (issuing summary judgment in favor of the aide); see also Moncivaiz vs.
Dekalb, No. 03 C 50226, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3997 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2004) (secretary
unwilling to translate options that include abortion); Maria Gallagher, Fired EMT Sues After
Refusing to Transport Woman for Abortion, LIFENEWS.COM (May 11, 2004, 9:00 AM),
http://www.lifenews.com/nat503.html.
222. Newton, supra note 136.
223. Lindsay, supra note 113, at 26; see also B.M. Dickens & R.J. Cook, The Scope and
Limits of Conscientious Objection, 71 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 71, 75 (2000)
(administrators “are not instrumental or complicit in health care decisions”).
224. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 70/4 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(3)
(West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.065(2)(a) (West 2008). Recent amendments to
federal law allow individuals to refuse “to perform or assist in the performance of any part of
a health service program or research activity funded in whole or in part” by the federal
government based on “his religious beliefs or moral convictions.” 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d)
(2006).
225. Julie D. Cantor, Conscientious Objection Gone Awry—Restoring Selfless
Professionalism in Medicine, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1484, 1485 (2009) (using the term
“conscience creep” to describe the phenomenon in the healthcare field).
226. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879).
227. Kenneth R. Seeskin, Genuine Appeals to Conscience, 12 J. VALUE INQUIRY 296, 298
(1978).
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D. Unjustified Conscientious Objection to Same-Sex Marriage
Claims of conscientious objection to same-sex marriage lie far afield from the
distinct and compelling features of conscientious objection traditionally recognized
by law. Objections to same-sex marriage do not implicate life and death. Although
marriage objectors claim that their involvement renders them morally responsible
for the act of same-sex marriage to a degree they cannot live with, their
involvement is generally not necessary or proximate to the marriage. Providing
goods, benefits, and services as one normally does lacks the moral complexity of
medicine. Nor typically does objection occur in an environment of professional
ethical constraints.
To spin out this thesis, this Section applies these principles along several
categories of objectors from officiants to dressmakers, and marriage counselors to
hospital administrators. MCP would cover them broadly, encompassing recognition
of couples’ married status for purposes of benefits or services and “facilitation” of
the perpetuation of marriage through the delivery of services. Although this Section
concentrates on individual objectors, reserving for the next Part the particular
problems of institutional objections, it addresses the objection to recognizing or
facilitating the perpetuation of same-sex marriage more generally.
First and most obviously, objectors to same-sex marriage cannot identify a harm
equivalent to the military or medical contexts. At most, they might claim some
diffuse harm to the institution of marriage.228 The fact that marriage, as opposed to
death or bodily harm, is the ultimate consequence indicates that cooperation might
be justified by the proportionate reason of continuing in one’s profession or acting
as a law-abiding citizen.229 Legal duties of nondiscrimination would further
mitigate the cooperator’s responsibility.230
Second, by and large, the same-sex marriage context lacks the moral complexity
and connection to shared ethics that medical conscientious objection requires. The
standard bearers of marriage objection—photographers, florists, and landlords—
operate as they ordinarily do and do not base their objections in any shared ethics
(nor indeed do their occupations have such commitments). For such objectors, it is
virtually impossible to think of what might substitute for ethical duties like “do no
harm” or “relieve suffering.” To the extent that one could imagine duties, like “sell
only quality products,” they bear no relevance to marriage.

228. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL.
581, 599 (1999) (“[V]alidation of gay marriage would not cause direct, proximate harm, but
it would damage society by degrading the way we see and relate to others.”); see also Carlos
A. Ball, The Proper Role of Morality in State Policies on Sexual Orientation and Intimate
Relationships, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 81, 94 (2011) (observing that opponents
“have not offered proof that the relationships of heterosexual married couples in those
jurisdictions have been affected or changed by the recognition of same-sex marriages”).
229. See Armand H. Matheny Antommaria, Conscientious Objection in Clinical
Practice: Notice, Informed Consent, Referral, and Emergency Treatment, 9 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 81, 85 (2011).
230. See Antommaria, supra note 128, at 206 (noting legal constraints influence
evaluation of responsibility).
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That said, because MCP applies to all individuals, some objectors could belong
to professions characterized by moral complexity and shared ethics (including
medicine). The requirement that objections originate in professional ethics
themselves, however, seems absent from the marriage context. Whereas doctors
cite their obligation to preserve life to refuse assisted suicide, those who decline to
perform IVF for lesbian couples cannot anchor their refusal in professional ethics.
Notwithstanding physicians’ ability to choose their patients, such refusals of care
cannot be framed as a requirement of professional ethics. Indeed, medical ethics
prohibit such acts as impermissible discrimination.231 Similarly, if a tax or family
law attorney objected to serving gay married couples, he or she would be hard
pressed to identify the ethical norm supporting the objection.
Third and most significantly, virtually all objections to marriage founder on the
requirements of causal and proximate responsibility for the act of marriage. MCP
covers objections that run from after-the-fact recognition to observation to
performance. Laycock himself admits that many are “transactions well removed
from the wedding and not involving explicit reference to the marriage.”232
Undoubtedly, some same-sex marriage objectors removed in time and space with
little to no causal connection to the wedding will believe they bear moral
responsibility for the marriage. Nonetheless, their objections do not satisfy the
bases for conscientious objection.
Again, retailers providing goods and services for the solemnization and
celebration of a wedding prove easy cases. Cake, music, and flowers undoubtedly
enhance a wedding celebration, but they are not necessary either to it or to the
marriage. Unlike the medical context, the involvement of objecting vendors cannot
be said to have caused the marriage in any way. A couple could wed with or
without floral arrangements. Although such retailers may be proximate in time and
space (a photographer, for instance, will be at the ceremony), they lack any
causative role. To the degree they are involved, their participation is analogous to
that of a bystander.
Other retail services may be in the causal chain but quite remote. Consider the
limo company that transports one of the fiancés to the wedding or the venue that
rents the couple an event space. Both may be necessary to the occurrence of the
marriage. Their participation, however, is attenuated. It does not suffice for the
marriage to occur and is mediated by multiple intervening actors, including the
officiant and the couple themselves. To return momentarily to the medical analogy,
such cooperation is even less direct and more remote than referral for or
information about an abortion—neither of which is typically excused as

231. AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 10.05 - Potential Patients, AM. MED. ASS’N,
http://www.ama-assn.org//ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics
/opinion1005.page (“Physicians cannot refuse to care for patients based on race, gender,
sexual orientation, or any other criteria that would constitute invidious discrimination . . . .”).
Like physicians, other professionals generally have the ability to choose clients and limit the
issues they will handle and simultaneously bear duties of nondiscrimination through public
accommodations laws or ethical codes, sometimes reinforced by licensing requirements.
232. Laycock, supra note 7, at 195 (proceeding to argue that the distance reduces the
burden on the couple’s ability to marry).
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conscientious objection.233 These vendors’ involvement in the marriage approaches
that of store clerks in over-the-counter sales of emergency contraception, which is
so attenuated as to “preclude[] justifiable claims that such participation amounts to
immoral cooperation.”234
After the wedding celebration, MCP extends to a number of situations that are
remote from and without any causal link to the marriage. These include allowing
religiously affiliated businesses to refuse to treat a marriage as valid, presumably
for housing, benefits, visitation, etc., and small secular businesses and individuals
to deny married couples spousal benefits and rental housing. If the wedding is
analogized to the event of the contested medical procedure, the ongoing status of
married is akin to treating a person differently for the entirety of their lives based
on whether they had received an abortion, emergency contraception, or other
contested service—claims not permitted under traditional conscientious objection
law.
One could argue that benefits, recognition, and access to housing constitute
incentives to marry. The connection, however, is both remote and unlikely to lead
to any specific marriage. By the time these entities encounter the couple, the
marriage is a fait accompli. Denying a couple equal treatment decades after their
marriage will not undo it.
Nor can any endorsement of the specific marriage be implied, because the
cooperator’s act (baking cake or providing health insurance) is distinct from the act
of the “wrongdoer” and is not itself wrong. Presumably, the objectors have good
reason to believe that their normal engagement in their occupation is morally
sound. The fact that their activity relates to a gay marriage does not change its
moral character. For those retailers in the causal chain, the act of cooperation is not
unlike the centuries-old example of the servant carrying a letter to his master’s
lover, which is “morally indifferent and not like the object of his master’s illicit
action, that is, adultery.”235 Given the attenuated nature of involvement, with regard
to benefits, for example, courts have reasoned that requiring recipients of city funds
to extend the same health and fringe benefits to employees with domestic partners
as to employees with spouses does not demand they endorse those relationships.236
Individual counselors and others who “directly facilitate the perpetuation of any
marriage,”237 as MCP calls it, at first glance appear to be closer cases. Like medicine,
counseling requires intimacy and subjects therapists to ethical constraints. Counselors
also have a more robust claim to proximity and perhaps causation. The couple likely
intends it to foster, if not cause, the survival of their relationship.

233. See supra notes 178–79.
234. Antommaria, supra note 128, at 210.
235. Keenan & Kopfensteiner, supra note 136, at 25.
236. E.g., Catholic Charities of Me., Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 2d 77, 95 (D.
Me. 2004) (“Providing benefits to domestic partners does not represent an endorsement of
non-family relationships any more than providing benefits to unmarried pregnant women
represents an endorsement of single parenthood.”); see also Catholic Charities of
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 89 (2004) (holding that insurance coverage
“leaves Catholic Charities free to express its disapproval of prescription contraceptives and
to encourage its employees not to use them”).
237. Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 3.
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Nonetheless, the causal link is anemic. The counselor does not perform the
marriage nor is she necessary to it. Moreover, MCP presumes the couple will
already be wed, such that the counseling will be remote in time and space from the
marriage. The counselor’s participation does not suffice either for the existence or
perpetuation of the marriage. Finally, professional ethics require counselors and
social workers to be nondirective.238 Unlike doctors, they need not act in a client’s
best interest or share decisions; “[t]heir dilemma may be eased in that, being
nondirective, they have no complicity in what they believe to be patients’ moral
errors.”239
Granting a license and officiating a marriage come closer to the direct and
proximate involvement exempted by medical conscience clauses. Both are central
to the marriage, and the officiant is as proximate as a cooperator could possibly be
to the act. That these are the only objections that overlap with any principles
underlying traditional conscientious objection regimes helps explain why
legislators have been most receptive to these objections. They have often carved
out exemptions for individuals who might have to perform marriages to which they
object.240 Indeed, as Lupu and Tuttle indicate, if MCP proponents limited their
advocacy to solemnization of a same-sex marriage, the abortion analogy might
become stronger.241 Note, however, that the objection still lacks the serious
consequences that underpin the abortion context.
Marriage conscience protection radically departs from the limiting principles
that serve as the foundation of conscientious objector protection in medicine and
the military. It shares little in common with our nation’s tradition of protecting
conscientious objection. Instead, it seeks to excuse from compliance with the law
objectors who play little to no causal role in the alleged wrongdoing, are often
distant from it, and operate in a context where any harm to others is theoretical,
rather than potentially fatal.
IV. MEDICINE AS A FLAWED MODEL FOR SAFEGUARDING CONSCIENCE
The analogy to conscientious objection in the medical model is inapt, and
accommodation under antidiscrimination law traditionally rejects the broad and
absolute exemptions sought here. Still, one might argue that religious freedom is a
superior value to equality and that, even if objections do not rise to the level of
conscientious objection, wide-ranging exemptions should be enacted to protect
religious freedom.
Marriage conscience protection in the medical model, however, would not only
fail to protect but actively undermine religious freedom. As this Part shows, MCP
242
replicates two major flaws of the medical model to the detriment of conscience.
First, as Section A demonstrates, protecting institutional interest in the name of

238. Dickens & Cook, supra note 223, at 75.
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
241. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 292–93.
242. As I have argued in previous work, the asymmetrical protection of conscience in
medicine sets up new conflicts of conscience even as it resolves others. See generally
Sepper, supra note 14.
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corporate conscience is at odds with the exercise of individual conscience.
Authorizing a business to demand that its employees adhere to a moral perspective
quashes their ability to live out their own convictions. As Section B discusses,
recognizing this inherent tension unearths a second, related problem: conscience
protection in the medical model takes a one-sided view of religion and morality.
People of conscience and institutions on the pro-marriage-equality side of the moral
divide go unnoticed, even as marriage conscience protection imposes significant
burdens on them.
A. Tension Between Individual Conscience and Corporate Interest
The most radical aspect of marriage conscience protection lies in its extension to
claims of conscience by secular and religiously affiliated businesses engaged in
commerce, allowing them to avoid their nondiscrimination obligations. In so doing,
MCP relies on the assumption that artificial, legal entities have and experience
something like the individual human’s capacity for conscience. Yet, its proponents
have failed to offer a robust theoretical defense of institutional conscience or to
consider the implications of prioritizing institutional interest for individual
conscience.
The concept of conscience for artificial entities is more difficult than MCP
proponents acknowledge. Conscience is a distinctly human capacity generally
referring to our “human knowledge of right and wrong, and thus encompasses our
moral consciousness, process of moral decision making, and settled moral
243
judgments or decisions.”
Corporations lack these distinctly human
characteristics. Whereas an individual makes conscientious judgments that define
244
“the central moral core of her character,” corporations are defined by a profit
motive that is so detached from moral reasoning that discussion still proceeds as to
whether businesses are morally responsible for their actions—let alone entitled to
245
moral rights.
Although, as I have argued elsewhere, discussing institutional interests in terms
246
of “conscience” is not theoretically convincing, institutional interests may lie in

243. Darlene Fozard Weaver, Conscience: Rightly Formed and Otherwise,
COMMONWEAL, Sept. 23, 2005, at 10, 11; see also Douglas Langston, Medieval Theories of
Conscience, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY (May 5, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu
/archives/sum2006/entries/conscience-medieval/ (noting that the medieval view “regard[ed]
human beings as capable of knowing in general what ought to be done and applying this
knowledge through conscience to particular decisions about action”).
244. Dan W. Brock, Conscientious Refusal by Physicians and Pharmacists: Who Is
Obligated to Do What, and Why?, 29 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 187, 189 (2008); see
also Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience?, 76 U.
COLO. L. REV. 911, 935 (2005) (asserting that the most plausible rationale for respecting
conscience is that it is central to personhood).
245. See, e.g., Rogene A. Buchholz & Sandra B. Rosenthal, Integrating Ethics All the
Way Through: The Issue of Moral Agency Reconsidered, 66 J. BUS. ETHICS 233 (2006);
Geoff Moore, Corporate Moral Agency: Review and Implications, 21 J. BUS. ETHICS 329
(1999) (both summarizing debates).
246. Sepper, supra note 14, at 1539–45.
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the value of allowing individuals to associate with one another. When and how
these interests should overcome individual conscience, however, is vigorously
247
contested.
One need not settle this debate to appreciate that the institutional
interest, whatever it may be, inherently stands in tension with the individual
exercise of conscience.
Take the religious organizations that the MCP proposal would cover. These
include universities, hospitals, social services, daycare centers, and adoption
agencies, many of which are large employers and service providers. For example,
religious hospitals, which could deny couples visitation under MCP, account for
248
approximately one in five hospital beds in the United States. Catholic hospitals
249
alone employ nearly 800,000 people.
MCP would free these powerful
institutions to discriminate in employment, housing, admissions, and provision of
goods and services to the public.
Because organizations are rarely monolithic, protecting institutional positions on
moral issues means imposing them on individual humans (be they consumers or
employees). Individuals often become associated with employers or vendors for
reasons other than shared moral positions. One cannot assume they all share moral
convictions and that institutional policy reflects each individual. In large
organizations, in particular, individuals hold a plurality of beliefs.
The experience of Catholic Charities of Boston, which is often invoked by MCP
250
proponents, provides a case in point. Over two decades, under a contract with the
state foster system, Catholic Charities placed 720 children, thirteen of them with
251
gay foster parents. After a journalist revealed these adoptions had taken place,
the board of Catholic Charities unanimously affirmed its commitment to continuing
252
such adoptions. The bishops subsequently overturned the decision, prompting
253
seven board members to resign in protest. Among them was board chairman and

247. Compare Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty
and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009) (contending that religious entities,
among other institutions, are First Amendment institutions whose own norms can substitute
for government regulation), with Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against
Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013) (expressing skepticism about religious
institutionalism and arguing that individual rights of conscience sufficiently protect First
Amendment values).
248. LOIS UTTLEY & RONNIE PAWELKO, NO STRINGS ATTACHED: PUBLIC FUNDING OF
RELIGIOUSLY-SPONSORED HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002), http://www.merger
watch.org/storage/pdf-files/bp_no_strings_hilights.pdf. Catholic healthcare alone accounts
for 14.9%. CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED
STATES (2013), http://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/general-files/mini_profile-pdf.
249. CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., THE CATHOLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION
ADVOCACY AGENDA 2011–2012 (112TH CONGRESS) (manuscript on file with the Indiana
Law Journal).
250. See Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston, WKLY. STANDARD, May 15, 2006, at 20;
Robin Wilson, Op-Ed., Protection for All in Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2009,
at A39.
251. Wen, supra note 39.
252. Patricia Wen, Seven Quit Charity over Policy of Bishops, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2006,
at A1.
253. Id.
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devout Catholic, Peter Meade, who stated that his conscience prevented him from
254
endorsing a morally wrong policy of discrimination.
As this example shows, even when individuals within an organization concur on
general principles, disagreement may emerge in concrete circumstances. For the
board members, the central moral goal of Catholic Charities was helping children
in need. To the extent disapproval of certain family structures was a commitment, it
could cede to the primary aim.255 The bishops, however, disagreed, and—in this
case—their views prevailed. In other religious organizations, the moral beliefs of
administrators, board members, or employees might determine the course of the
organization. In any case, allowing one group to represent the “conscience” of the
organization suggests only some individuals’ moral convictions count.
Disjunction between individual convictions seems particularly likely in the
religiously affiliated businesses and secular employers that are at the heart of the
MCP proposal. Most commercial providers—religiously affiliated or not—will be
unlikely to send a clear anti–marriage equality message to potential employees,
associates, and customers. The central moral goal (and message) of many religious
organizations will be delivering services, whether to the needy as charitable
mission or to paying customers as revenue generation. It would be difficult to
categorize the message of the nursing homes, clinics, food banks, shelters,
universities, and commercial entities associated with religious groups as anti-samesex marriage.
Of course, some organizations do unite employees and customers who share
particular values. One of the most compelling arguments for protecting the
institutional interest of medical facilities lies in the value some patients ascribe to
religiously sensitive care. In the vulnerable state of illness, infirmity, or dying,
some patients will want to be treated within facilities that reflect their religious or
moral values.256 Likewise, in some subcategory of religious organizations, likeminded adherents might associate around an anti–marriage equality message. One
could imagine small schools, summer camps, or marriage counseling centers
devoted to religious doctrine that manifest these attributes. At best, however, the
existence of such entities counsels toward accommodating organizations with a
religious mission that primarily serve and employ coadherents in the model of
antidiscrimination law.257
What about secular small businesses covered by marriage conscience
protection? Smaller businesses may bring together employees who share
convictions and seek to carry them out in the workplace. They may involve closer

254. Peter Meade, Op-Ed., Conscience Wins Out for This Catholic, BOS. HERALD, Mar. 2,
2006, at 31.
255. See Patricia Wen, Archdiocesan Agency Aids in Adoptions by Gays, BOS. GLOBE,
Oct. 22, 2005, at A1 (noting similar claims by the director of San Francisco’s Catholic
Charities).
256. See SUSAN POLNIASZEK, EDITH G. WALSH & JOSHUA M. WIENER, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., HOSPITALIZATIONS OF NURSING HOME RESIDENTS: BACKGROUND
AND OPTIONS 8 (2011).
257. Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 395 (1987) (arguing for allowing a
religious institution to “utilize its membership criteria as employment criteria”).
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(and sometimes family) relationships between employer and employees. For a few
businesses, a generalized position on moral issues may be clear to potential
employees and customers. A bookstore that only sells evangelical literature is more
likely to attract evangelicals as employees and consumers.
Nonetheless, small secular businesses also involve people—consumers,
employees, or owners—who could be expected to disagree over moral issues. Few
attract employees and customers with their moral message. As a general rule,
commercial businesses open to the public to deliver flowers or bake wedding cakes
select employees based on their skills and experience, not their religious training.
Customers typically choose to contract for these goods based on quality, not
similarity between the owner’s moral code and their own.
As is commonly recognized in antidiscrimination doctrine, the profit motive
258
makes any moral mission secondary at best. Indeed, when the basic business
model is, for example, a bakery, a message of rejection of “same-sex marriage”
may be lost to the consumer altogether. This is especially likely here because,
according to MCP proponents, the business would be required to serve gays
259
without discrimination, unless they were engaged or married.
Ultimately, protecting institutional interest, whether of large religious
organizations or small secular businesses, risks undermining the consciences of
employees and consumers. It relies on the shaky supposition that corporations have
consciences to set up a regime that inherently conflicts with the exercise of
individual conscience. The asserted interest in religious freedom works to suppress
the religious freedom of individuals within these institutions and, as we shall see, of
organizations committed to same-sex marriage as a moral or religious matter.
B. Undermining Conscience on the Pro–Marriage Equality Side
The MCP proposal reproduces a second flaw of medical conscience
legislation—its failure to grant that conscience exists on both sides of the moral
divide. Medical conscience legislation safeguards a single moral position in the
abortion (or end-of-life) debates. How providers will be treated depends entirely on
the content of their consciences, not on the sincerity or depth of their commitment
to the conscientious position. Yet, conscience equally may compel providers to
deliver a controversial treatment to a patient in need.260
Nor does the medical legislation acknowledge the interests of institutions
committed to performing controversial procedures (like Planned Parenthood). They
must accommodate individuals who violate institutional norms by refusing to

258. See George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious
Freedom, 95 KY. L.J. 553, 572 (2007) (noting that legislatures and courts refuse for-profit
firms religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws).
259. See Wilson et al. Md. Ltr., supra note 8, at 5 (explaining that the authors’ proposed
legislation would provide protection to businesses that refused to provide services to samesex couples only when the refusal “related to a marriage, solemnizing a marriage, or being
forced to treat a marriage as valid”); see also Stern, supra note 7, at 37 (providing the
example that the Hilton family, even if they morally objected to same-sex marriage, would
not be allowed to refuse a hotel room to a same-sex couple).
260. See Sepper, supra note 14, at 1532–39.
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perform such procedures. By contrast, when an institution refuses to deliver legal,
necessary care, the law does recognize a concept of “institutional conscience.”261
These asymmetries render the legislation both ineffective and incoherent; it
sporadically protects conscience and simultaneously sets up new conflicts of
conscience.
Marriage conscience protection would replicate these asymmetries. In every
workplace that accepts same-sex marriage as moral, individuals who reject it may
defy institutional commitments. Religious organizations and businesses of all sizes
that support gay rights would be required to accommodate dissenting individuals.
By contrast, at least in small and religiously affiliated businesses, individuals who
believe same-sex marriage to be morally permissible or required would have to
comply with employers’ policies of refusal. And entities that reject gay rights
would be free to hire and fire employees who refuse to follow their policies.
Compare two cases sometimes criticized by exemption proponents as typical of
the problems faced by religious objectors (although both concern employment
262
discrimination, rather than marriage). In the first, Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard
263
Co.,
an employee of Hewlett-Packard (HP) was dismissed for repeatedly
violating the company’s harassment policy. After HP displayed posters—one of
which featured a gay employee—for its diversity campaign, Peterson posted
scriptural passages calling for death for a man who lies with mankind, due to what
264
he described as a religious duty “to expose evil when confronted with sin.” The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that HP was required to accommodate
Peterson, but he had repeatedly rebuffed its attempts to do so. The court rejected
the view that Peterson’s proposals, which would either allow him to continue to
harass his fellow employees or exclude sexual orientation from the diversity
265
program, were reasonable. The logic of marriage conscience protection (putting
aside the size limitation in the current version of the proposal) would demand the
opposite result, resolving the employer-employee conflict in Peterson’s favor.
266
The second case, State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., flips
the roles of employer-employee. A chain of for-profit sports clubs argued that the
owners’ religious beliefs required discriminatory employment practices. It cited
biblical prohibitions on working with “unbelievers” as support for restricting
267
managerial positions to Christians and refusing to hire devout non-Christians.
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the club’s defense. This time, the approach
of marriage conscience protection would suggest that the business, unlike HP,
should have been permitted to maintain its identity and impose institutional norms
268
on employees and applicants.

261. See id. at 1547–53 (detailing the asymmetries in legislative treatment of conscience).
262. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 7, at 25, 39, 51 (identifying these cases as among those
“in which the law requires an institution or a person to act in ways that are reasonably
understood to relate to the same-sex marriage itself”).
263. 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
264. Id. at 600–02.
265. Id. at 607–08.
266. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985) (en banc).
267. Id. at 846–47.
268. See Severino, supra note 7, at 960 (criticizing outcome in McClure).
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As these cases show, the approach taken by MCP advocates would not
consistently protect either individual conscience or institutional interest. The
consciences of individuals whose moral or religious beliefs support same-sex
marriage fall by the wayside. Under MCP, refusing businesses could demand that
their employees, irrespective of their conscientious beliefs, refuse services, goods,
or recognition of status to same-sex couples. If, however, allowing individuals to
follow their consciences in commercial activity is an interest worth preserving, it is
unclear why individual conscience should not be prioritized uniformly. Shouldn’t
employees who support same-sex marriage based on their moral convictions be
entitled to accommodation by objecting employers?
Likewise, under MCP, the interests of a pro–gay rights company in setting
policy or bringing together like-minded individuals would be rendered null. Despite
their commitments, employers—including religiously affiliated organizations—
would be prevented from discriminating against objectors to same-sex marriage
and could not refuse to serve them, provide them spousal benefits, or acknowledge
their marriages as valid. The individual objector could interfere with the
institutional position—or the company’s very ability to comply with the law. This
is in sharp contrast to the deference to “institutional conscience” that MCP grants
similarly situated objecting institutions.
The MCP proposal thus would generate new conflicts between commercial
interest and human conscience, even as it resolves others. For example, an
employer’s instructions to deny services to gay couples might cause a crisis of
conscience for an employee deeply committed to equality. This moral precept could
be founded in religious conviction, even the biblical injunction to “love your
neighbor as yourself.” Turning the couple away could be expected to result in a
guilty conscience. Violating the employer’s policy, on the other hand, might cause
the employee to lose her job.
As with abortion, the asymmetries flow from a cramped vision of conscience.
The very framing of refusal as “conscientious objection” turns a blind eye to the
range of conscientious positions. It seeks to establish opposition to same-sex
marriage as the religious or moral position.
With regard to same-sex marriage, moral and religious beliefs in the United
States are far more varied—and increasingly more supportive of such marriages—
than the MCP proposal acknowledges. The very presentation of the issue of
same-sex marriage as “Gay Rights versus Religious Freedom,” as Flynn argues,
“ignores that many religious faiths support same-sex marriage as a matter of
theology [and] that many gay people are members of religious faiths.”269 Consider,
for example, the ministers who faced criminal charges for conducting same-sex
marriages or the public officials who granted marriage licenses because they
determined it to be right.270 As law and society have come to recognize the rights of
gays, religious doctrine has followed, with many religious groups growing more

269. Flynn, supra note 13, at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. See Thomas Crampton, Two Ministers Are Charged in Gay Nuptials, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2004, at B1; see also Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758,
1793 (2005) (explaining that plaintiffs in the first same-sex marriage case held deep religious
beliefs and that Catholic priest they consulted opined that Christ would be open to their union).
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accepting of gays.271 Given a plurality of religious beliefs, protecting conscience
may not support exemptions in the way MCP proponents assume.
V. POLICY LESSONS FROM MEDICINE
MCP proponents claim that the medical model offers an effective way to reduce
conflict in the marketplace and public life. Authorizing conscientious objections,
they predict, will have little effect on gay couples. Few objectors will take
advantage of marriage conscience protection and those who do will eventually
leave the market.
This Part argues that the experience of conscience legislation in medicine
suggests these salutary effects may not be forthcoming. As Sections A and B show,
one could equally anticipate that MCP will prolong strife and impose hefty burdens
on same-sex couples.
A. Conflict Reduction Rationale
A benefit of MCP, proponents claim, is its ability to defuse conflict. Laycock,
for instance, forewarns that “[r]efusing exemptions to such religious dissenters will
politically empower the most demagogic opponents of same-sex marriage. It will
ensure that the issue remains alive, bitter, and deeply divisive.”272 He predicts,
“[p]ut religious exemptions in the bill, and at a stroke, you take away one of the
opponents’ strongest arguments.”273 What follows is the good-for-gays argument
that MCP will not only reduce civil strife, but also lead to more rapid acceptance of
gay families.274 In short order, MCP advocates say, exemptions will become
unnecessary.275
Two objections come to mind. First and most obviously, any increased
acceptance of gay families would result not from religious exemptions, but from
marriage equality itself. In Massachusetts and Iowa, public opposition dropped
quickly following court decisions in favor of marriage equality.276 Contrary to
predictions, a flood of objections did not result nor did the debate grow more
heated.277

271. Eskridge, supra note 48, at 710–16 (describing shifts in religious teachings in light
of legal acceptance of gays).
272. Laycock Conn. Ltr., supra note 8, at 2.
273. Id.
274. See id. (“It is obviously better for the traditional religious believers; on a few
moments’ reflection, it is also better for the same-sex couples.”).
275. See Stern, supra note 7, at 308 (“[T]here are probably far fewer people around who
would invoke such exemptions than is generally thought. And, given the poll data, there will
be even fewer as older people move off the commercial scene.” (footnote omitted)).
276. Press Release, Public Policy Polling, Gay Marriage Has 2:1 Support in MA (Sept. 23,
2011), available at http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_MA_0923.pdf;
Press Release, Public Policy Polling, Iowans Up on Gay Marriage and Branstad (Aug. 26, 2011),
available at http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/PPP_Release_IA_0826.pdf.
277. Patrick J. Egan & Nathaniel Persily, Court Decisions and Trends in Support for
Same-Sex Marriage, POLLING REP., Aug. 17, 2009, at 1, 6.
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Second, the medical model suggests that exemptions, in and of themselves, do
not reduce conflict. The abortion debate cannot be said to have dissipated. Nor,
indeed, has conscience legislation resolved clashes between patients, providers,
and institutions. Today, one in five doctors in a religiously affiliated health
facility reports experiencing conflicts between religious restrictions and their
duties to their patients.278 As one might expect, obstetrician-gynecologists
experience even higher rates of conflict.279 Patients and providers frequently
organize against hospital mergers that threaten access to reproductive and end-oflife care.280 In several states, medical associations also have lobbied against wideranging conscience bills.281 In others, challenges have been mounted against
conscience clauses that impede healthcare.282
Over time, conscience legislation may have simply shifted litigation.
Today, it is refusing healthcare providers and auxiliary staff, like paramedics,
who sue their employers. 283 The volume of litigation, as with willing

278. Debra B. Stulberg, Ryan E. Lawrence, Jason Shattuck & Farr A. Curlin, Religious
Hospitals and Primary Care Physicians: Conflicts over Policies for Patient Care, 25 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 725, 727 (2010); see also Leora Eisenstadt, Separation of Church and
Hospital: Strategies to Protect Pro-Choice Physicians in Religiously Affiliated Hospitals, 15
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 136 (2003) (reporting that an Illinois Catholic hospital asked a
doctor who performed abortions elsewhere to resign as chief of the Department of
Obstetrics-Gynecology).
279. Thirty-seven percent of obstetrician-gynecologists who practice in religiously
affiliated institutions (and over half of those in Catholic institutions) reported conflicts.
Debra B. Stulberg, Annie M. Dude, Irma Dahlquist & Farr A. Curlin, Obstetrician–
Gynecologists, Religious Institutions, and Conflicts Regarding Patient Care Policies, 207
AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 73.e1, 73.e4 (2012).
280. See MERGER WATCH, PROPOSED HOSPITAL MERGERS BLOCKED BY COMMUNITY
ACTION (2005), available at http://www.mergerwatch.org/storage/pdf-files/ch_proposal
_blocked.pdf (listing blocked mergers across the country); Karen Heller, Anger at Abington
Hospital, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 8, 2012, at A02 (describing staff and patient backlash to a
merger that would eliminate abortion services).
281. Martha Stoddard, Conscience Bill Running Out of Time: Protections for Health
Providers Need Study, Ashford Says, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 9, 2012, at 01B
(detailing professional societies’ opposition to Nebraska conscience bill); Andis Robeznieks,
Battle of the Conscience Clause: When Practitioners Say No, AM. MED. NEWS (Apr. 11,
2005), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/04/11/prsa0411.htm (noting that Michigan
and Wisconsin medical societies opposed conscience bills).
282. Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 970–72 (Alaska
1997); Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, 366 A.2d 641, 642–43 (N.J. 1976). Both cases held
that the state conscience legislation did not extend to secular hospitals. See also Nat’l Family
Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (challenging
federal conscience clause that prohibits federal grant recipients from discriminating against
individuals or entities that refuse to provide abortions); California v. United States, No.
C 05-00328 JSW, 2008 WL 744840 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2008) (challenging federal
conscience clause as potentially conflicting with hospital legal duties to provide or refer for
life- or health-preserving abortions).
283. See, e.g., Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2010); Nead
v. Bd. of Trs. of E. Ill. Univ., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 1582454 (C.D. Ill. June 6, 2006);
Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of Miami, 400 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Swanson v.
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providers,284 remains small, likely because healthcare facilities tend to resolve
conflicts through internal processes.285
Granting a conscience exemption may not only shift conflicts, but also intensify
future claims to exemptions.286 In the medical arena, the past fifteen years have
seen ever-more vociferous demands from objectors. Pharmacist conscience
legislation, once unheard of, has spread.287 In some states, payers, such as
employers and insurance companies, have successfully attained the ability to
impose moral beliefs on insureds.288 Most recently, the Affordable Care Act’s
requirement that insurance plans cover contraception has provoked claims of
conscientious objection from businesses ranging from Catholic-affiliated hospitals
to for-profit construction companies.289
One might reasonably suggest that abortion is and will remain more fraught than
same-sex marriage. Certainly, the rapid rise in public support for marriage equality
seems to indicate so. That said, in the 1960s and 1970s, public opinion also steadily
increased to favor legal abortion.290 As is relevant to marriage equality, increasing
St. John’s Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1979); Larson v. Albany Med. Ctr., 676
N.Y.S.2d 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); see also Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing:
Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal, 21 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 163, 166 (2010)
(reporting a 2005 Louisiana case denying summary judgment to a hospital that fired a nurse
who refused to administer emergency contraception); Seth Augenstein, Nurses’ Abortion
Suit Asks: At What Point Is Assisting Facilitating? RNs at UMDNJ Objected to Taking Part
in Procedure, STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 15, 2011, at 025; Gallagher, supra note 221.
284. See, e.g., Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1975) (requiring county hospitals to
make facilities available to doctors to perform abortions); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph
of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 310–12 (9th Cir. 1974) (documenting several actions to compel
denominational hospitals to perform tubal ligations); McCabe v. Nassau Cnty. Med. Ctr.,
453 F.2d 698, 702 n.7 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting three similar lawsuits in New York); Taylor v.
St. Vincent’s Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948, 949 (D. Mont. 1973) (regarding tubal ligation).
285. See Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 223 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting
hospital repeatedly offered other positions to a labor and delivery nurse); Grant v. Fairview
Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., No. Civ. 02-4232JNEJGL, 2004 WL 326694, at *1 (D. Minn.
Feb. 18, 2004) (discussing fact that hospital proposed allowing an ultrasound technician to
opt out of examining women contemplating abortion and to leave the room if any fetal
anomalies became apparent, but he rejected any accommodation that prevented him from
lecturing patients on religion).
286. See Strasser, supra note 13, at 29 (indicating that expanding conscience legislation
to procedures beyond abortion suggests “exemptions for those not wishing to promote samesex marriage might well expand”).
287. See generally Catherine Grealis, Note, Religion in the Pharmacy: A Balanced
Approach to Pharmacists’ Right to Refuse to Provide Plan B, 97 GEO. L.J. 1715 (2009)
(describing history of adoption of pharmacists’ conscience legislation).
288. See State Policies in Brief: Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, GUTTMACHER
INSTITUTE (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf.
289. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12CV158-HSO-RHW, 2012 WL
6831407 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2012) (dismissing suit filed by Catholic hospital); Korte v.
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 912 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (denying for-profit
construction company’s conscience claim). In a forthcoming paper, I refer to this
development as “Free Exercise Lochnerism,” which revives business attacks on the
regulatory state through religious liberty arguments.
290. Judith Blake, Abortion and Public Opinion: The 1960-1970 Decade, 171 SCIENCE
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popular support for abortion reform and legislative initiatives were themselves the
catalyst for controversy.291
I do not intend to suggest that marriage equality will follow an identical path.
Even the most favorable view of abortion sees it as a neutral medical procedure.
Marriage, by contrast, is cause for celebration. Nonetheless, the experience of
medical conscience legislation should give gay rights advocates and their allies in
state legislatures pause, especially given the recent movement to allow
conscientious objection to contraceptive coverage, despite overwhelming public
support for and use of contraception.
While it is possible that some states will legalize same-sex marriage more
quickly if wide-ranging exemptions are included, such exemptions may also
entrench opposition and lead to a permanent state of inequality between oppositeand same-sex couples. The experience of medical conscience legislation edifies.
The pre-Roe era acknowledged the diversity of religious views on the moral status
of the fetus and the moral agency of women seeking abortion.292 Religious support
of abortion rights was highly visible, with Protestant clergy tending to back reform
and even help women access abortions.293 Conscience and religion were accepted
bases for a pro-choice position. Today, by contrast, conscience and religion are
presumed to mean antichoice. The archetypal doctor driven by conscience to refuse
his patient’s requests is cemented in the public mind. Thus, members of Congress
suggest allowing hospitals to let pregnant women die in the name of conscience,
without any countervailing conscience claim from women or their doctors.294
Employers challenge requirements that insurance plans include contraception on
grounds of conscience.295 Lost is the recognition that religious and moral beliefs
exist on both sides.
540 (1971); Judith Blake, The Supreme Court’s Abortion Decisions and Public Opinion in
the United States, 3 POPULATION & DEV. R. 45, 49 (1977).
291. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New
Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2077 (2011).
292. In a challenge to the Hyde Amendment’s prohibition on Medicaid funding for
abortion, for example, the trial court held that a woman’s decision to terminate her
pregnancy is a conscientious one and may be “exercised in conformity with religious belief
and teaching protected by the First Amendment.” McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 742
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Rhonda Copelon & Sylvia A. Law, Nearly Allied to Her Right “to Be”—
Medicaid Funding for Abortion: The Story of Harris v. McRae, in WOMEN AND THE LAW
STORIES 207, 229–30 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011) (noting
testimony from Protestant, Conservative and Reform Judaism, and Baptist clergy in support
of legal abortion, and opposition from Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Church, and
Orthodox Judaism).
293. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 291, at 2048.
294. See Respect for Rights of Conscience Act of 2011, S. 1467, 112th Cong. (2011)
(“Nothing in this title (or any amendment made by this title) [which includes the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act that requires hospitals to stabilize emergency conditions]
shall be construed to require an individual or institutional health care provider, or authorize a
health plan to require a provider, to provide, participate in, or refer for a specific item or
service contrary to the provider’s religious beliefs or moral convictions.” ).
295. See Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12CV158-HSO-RHW, 2012
WL 6831407 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2012); Korte v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 912
F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ill. 2012).
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Similarly, one should question assumptions that opposition to same-sex
marriage will be short-lived and exemptions eventually repealed. Exemptions may
survive even if the public no longer supports them.296 This may be particularly
likely with regard to gay rights; empirical studies demonstrate that, across states,
incongruence between public support and policy works to their detriment.297 For
example, despite majority support in every state (except Utah) for preventing
sexual orientation discrimination in employment and housing,298 only twenty-one
states have enacted such statutes.299 In part, this incongruence is attributable to
“[p]owerful conservative religious interest groups [that] strongly affect gay rights
policy at the expense of majoritarian congruence.”300 There is reason to think that
these interest groups will not be satisfied with even ample “marriage conscience
protection” and will, in the end, seek to shape the law to their vision of society.301
B. Burden on Same-Sex Couples
Despite anticipating widespread objections in the absence of MCP,302 scholars
also predict that its existence will impose little burden on same-sex couples. They
make two intertwined claims: that few businesses or individuals will take
advantage of marriage conscience protection;303 and that burdens on same-sex
couples will not be onerous.304

296. Such incongruence may exist with regard to institutional restrictions on medical
care. Patricia Miller, Religion, Reproductive Health and Access to Services, CONSCIENCE,
Summer 2000, at 2, 7 (reporting that eighty-five percent of women surveyed said that
Catholic hospitals that receive government funds should permit doctors to provide any legal,
medically sound service).
297. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and
Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, 383 (2009).
298. Id. at 373 tbl.1.
299. Non-discrimination Laws: State by State Information, ACLU (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map; Statewide
Employment Laws and Policies, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 22, 2013), http://www.hrc.org
/files/assets/resources/employment_laws_072013.pdf; Statewide Housing Laws and Policies,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (June 19, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/housing
_laws_062013.pdf.
300. Lax & Phillips, supra note 297, at 383.
301. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 291, at 2048–49 (noting that, regarding the
abortion, the Catholic Church “was prepared to enter the political arena to ensure that the
law continued to reflect Church teachings”).
302. Berg et al. N.H. Ltr., supra note 8, at 4 (“[T]he volume of new litigation will be
immense. And religious liberty advocates can also be expected to sue state and local
governments for implementing, or even considering implementing [marriage equality].” ).
303. Berg, supra note 7, at 212 (opining that conflicts will be rare); Laycock Conn. Ltr.,
supra note 8, at 2 (“The number of people who assert their right to conscientious objection
will be small in the beginning, and it will gradually decline to insignificance . . . .”).
304. Wilson & Singer, supra note 95, at 13 (predicting that with regard to retailers “the
hardships are likely to be fewer” because there are many options and “the service that is
being denied . . . is not nearly as important as denying a person’s access to the legal status of
marriage”); Laycock Conn. Ltr., supra note 8, at 2 (“Exemptions for religious conscientious
objectors will not burden same-sex couples.”).
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The medical model suggests these empirical judgments should be viewed with
skepticism. Medical conscience legislation has contributed to a legal landscape of
decreased access to abortion. It encourages refusal from providers who hold no
strong moral or religious objections to abortion, because it does not require them to
establish the sincerity of their beliefs or assume alternate burdens.305 Indeed,
eighty-six percent of OB/GYNs never provide abortion,306 although only seven
percent of them are opposed to it in all instances.307 Allowing institutional refusal
also can generate refusal disproportionate to individual physicians’ moral
judgments. For example, at least sixteen percent of hospitals prohibit tubal
ligations, although few physicians object to performing them.308 The burden on
patients can be weighty.309
In the same-sex marriage context, predicting how frequent objections will be is
no easy task. One should hesitate, however, to draw conclusions from the number
we see now. These may be low precisely because discrimination based on sexual
orientation, whether religion based or not, remains legal in approximately half the
states.310 Today’s legal refusal of services, benefits, or housing could be
tomorrow’s discrimination lawsuit—or, under MCP, acceptable objection. If in fact
it is the act of marriage, rather than the status of the person, that offends certain
religious people, refusals actually should increase as same-sex couples gain access
to marriage.
As with controversial medical procedures, MCP could be expected to permit
objections that are not strongly held or sincere. Lynn Wardle identifies one
example that seems undermotivated: of twenty-four San Diego county clerks who
claimed religious objections to same-sex marriage, eighteen withdrew their
objections rather than be reassigned from issuing marriage licenses.311 Under MCP,
all twenty-four would be accommodated.

305. Meyers & Woods, supra note 196, at 118 (indicating that medical conscience
legislation leads to opportunistic refusals to provide abortion).
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Provision Among Practicing Obstetrician-Gynecologists, 118 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
609, 609 (2011).
307. See Lisa H. Harris, Alexandra Cooper, Kenneth A. Rasinski, Farr A. Curlin & Anne
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Obtain an Abortion, 118 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 905, 905 (2011).
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310. See sources cited supra note 299.
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Even assuming few individuals would object, the enactment of institutional
exemptions inevitably would burden same-sex couples. Consider, for example, that
in Washington, which recently legalized marriage equality, more than thirty percent
of patient admissions are to Catholic hospitals.312 Many religiously affiliated
organizations are formidable economic actors. There are 900 religiously affiliated
colleges and universities, with 1.7 million students.313 Under MCP, they could deny
recognition of couples’ marital status for housing, benefits, emergency contacts,
and so forth.
Denial of services by small businesses might also have widespread impact.
Exemption proponents predict that the market will solve any access problems. But
many gay couples live in areas with small markets; according to the 2000 census,
same-sex partner households exist in 99.3% of all U.S. counties.314 In communities
where there is large-scale opposition, these predictions rely on brave store owners
willing to take considerable personal and financial risk. Laycock suggests that
stores self-identify as willing or refusing by posting signs in the windows; then
“same-sex couples planning a wedding might be forced to pick their merchants
carefully, like black families driving across the South half a century ago.”315 But
this notion discounts the collective action problem that public accommodations
laws solve. MCP, moreover, dampens the ability of supportive businesses and
religious organizations to make a clear statement in favor of marriage equality,
precisely because they must accommodate employees unwilling to serve same-sex
couples.
Of course, any evaluation of the burden of conscience legislation on same-sex
couples depends on how one defines “burden.” MCP proponents describe denial of
access to services and to marriage itself as “mere inconvenience,” whereas
“[r]equiring a merchant to perform services that violate his deeply held moral
commitments is far more serious, different in kind and not just in degree.”316 They
argue that this weightier burden should only be imposed on a small business where
there would be a “substantial hardship” on same-sex couples (MCP would never
impose this burden on religiously affiliated objecting businesses, irrespective of the
consequences of the denial).317
To be sure, when the burden is presented as, for example, having to buy a
wedding dress at one store instead of another, it seems insubstantial. But this
perspective understates the harms. Failure to issue a marriage license or perform a
marriage could delay or deny a couple’s union. Even with regard to mundane
transactions, not all goods and services are fungible in terms of quality and price,

312. CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., supra note 248.
313. Profile of Post-Secondary Education, COUNCIL CHRISTIAN COLLEGES & U.,
http://www.cccu.org/filefolder/Profile_US_Post-Secondary_Education-updated2010.pdf.
314. James G. Pawelski, Ellen C. Perrin, Jane M. Foy, Carole E. Allen, James E.
Crawford, Mark Del Monte, Miriam Kaufman, Jonathan D. Klein, Karen Smith, Sarah
Springer, J. Lane Tanner & Dennis L. Vickers, The Effects of Marriage, Civil Union, and
Domestic Partnership Laws on the Health and Well-being of Children, 118 PEDIATRICS 349,
351 (2006).
315. Laycock, supra note 7, at 198, 200.
316. Id. at 198.
317. Wilson et al. N.Y. Ltr., supra note 8, at 14.
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despite what MCP advocates seem to assume.318 Reserving a room at a bed and
breakfast or ordering tablecloths for an anniversary party, for example, could cost
same-sex couples additional time, money, or both. With denial of spousal benefits
permitted under MCP, substantial out-of-pocket expenses accrue.319 Gay couples
denied benefits would spend an additional $28,595 to $211,993 in health costs and
lose up to $32,253 in pension income.320
Even when denied non-urgent commercial transactions, couples would suffer
significant dignitary and psychological damage.321 Being discriminated against is a
serious harm in its own right irrespective of the importance of the good sought in
commerce. For this reason, no serious argument exists that the Civil Rights Act
should not apply to theaters and restaurants, because movies and dinners out are not
urgent or essential. Same-sex couples would face uncertainty as to where they can
seek goods or services, feel humiliated by scrutiny and judgment that are not
normally part of a commercial transaction, and lose trust in public and private
institutions. A lesser burden would fall on opposite-sex couples, who would also
endure inquiries into their private relationships. Finally, as NeJaime argues, MCP
fails to appreciate “the profound connection between same-sex relationships and
lesbian and gay identity” and thus does not “address how it burdens status, or the
enactment of sexual orientation identity.”322
The proposed marriage conscience protection instead works to send gay identity
and relationships back into the closet. A lesbian could purchase a wedding dress
from an objecting shop by pretending to marry a man, or to buy it for a nonwedding
party. A gay man could visit his husband in the hospital by identifying as a relative.
A couple could live together as “roommates.”
One reasonably could object that burdens would still be higher in the medical
context because doctors are gatekeepers to healthcare in a way that the average
business is not. Charo observes that, because licensing creates a monopoly on
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medical services, “[t]he situation is not one in which a free market of products,
suppliers and buyers seek one another out without constraint.”323 Instead, when
doctors and pharmacists refuse to serve them, “patients have nowhere to turn,”324 a
situation that is exacerbated in emergencies. Given the lack of barriers and
emergency situations, one could expect the market to work with regard to ordinary
goods and services.
It does not follow, however, that the burden of MCP would be insubstantial.
Like medical legislation, MCP applies to licensed professionals, such as
counselors, and to monopoly-like institutions, such as hospitals, adoption agencies,
and social service providers. It extends to a variety of private, public, and quasipublic entities and all individual employees in a state.
In practice, conscientious objection protection could represent a more significant
encumbrance on marriage than on medical procedures, because the central purpose
of legalizing marriage between same-sex couples is the recognition of that marriage
by third parties. As Mary Anne Case argues, marriage today is “thin,” allowing
married couples to live together, have sex, procreate, or differentiate their roles—or
not—“while still having their commitment to one another recognized by third
parties including the state.”325 Marriage forms the mechanism through which
employers deliver benefits, businesses give deals, and the government distributes
public funds.326 It provides a rule that reduces the need to inquire more deeply into
the parties’ relationship.327 Thus, as Case says, civil marriage’s “principal legal
function, at least while the relationship is ongoing, may not be to structure relations
between the members of the marital couple, but instead to structure their relations
with third parties.”328
The importance of third-party recognition sharply differentiates same-sex
marriage from controversial medical procedures. No procedure provides a status
that third parties must (or do) use in order to allocate benefits or privileges. By
contrast, what same-sex couples arguably seek is not just flowers or pensions, but
recognition of their status as married. Whereas obligations to provide reproductive
healthcare can be discharged by other individuals without impeding the patient’s
objective,329 the duty not to discriminate cannot be fulfilled by anyone else.
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Private law cannot substitute for this recognition.330 A same-sex couple may
establish some rights and responsibilities without state recognition of their
relationship.331 But they cannot contract to receive tax and social security benefits
or public pensions, to be appointed as guardian of an incompetent partner, or to sue
for the wrongful death of a partner.332 They cannot access family healthcare plans,
discounted family rates, hospital visitation privileges, medical decision making,
and family housing. In theory, a couple might contract around this lack of
recognition, but, even in theory, the transaction costs would be inordinately high. In
practice, couples are unlikely to be able to predict every third party they will
encounter.
Even if parties that refused to recognize a couple’s married status were few and
far between, under MCP each same-sex couple would face, as now, significant
barriers to full respect for their status as married. Third-party recognition would no
longer be automatic. Decades after marrying, couples could still be denied
recognition of their relationships.
CONCLUSION
Medicine is not like marriage. The centrality of ethical and moral questions to
medicine sets it apart from business transactions. The physician is close to and
responsible for the contested act; the same cannot be said for the wedding vendors,
social services providers, and individuals to whom marriage conscience protection
would apply. Nor is medical conscience legislation a promising model for
protecting conscience or reducing conflict. If transferred to same-sex marriage
objections, it would only create new conflicts of conscience.
Without the medical analogy, marriage conscience protection loses its
theoretical and practical underpinnings. One is left to consider values of religion
and equality within the antidiscrimination framework, as our legal system has
historically done. Without the rubric of conscientious objection, exemption
proponents must engage with the status of those discriminated against and explain
why such accommodations would not apply equally to race, sex, and religious
discrimination. They must justify doing away with the longstanding separation
between religious and secular institutions and confront a framework that requires
balancing instead of absolute freedom for objectors. Narrow exemptions that vary
across contexts of housing, employment, and public accommodation discrimination
would be considered. Exemptions as broad as their MCP proposal are unlikely to
succeed, as Laycock’s comment that “same-sex couples planning a wedding might
be forced to pick their merchants carefully, like black families driving across the
South half a century ago” should suggest.333
Beyond the context of marriage, this Article’s identification of the principles
justifying protection of conscientious objection provides the groundwork for
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distinguishing between permissible and impermissible claims for conscientious
objection. As invocations of “conscientious objection” spread to bus drivers334 and
supermarket cashiers,335 these principles provide a theoretical bulwark to shore up
the slippery slope of conscience.
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